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ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE 
SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY INQUIRY IN 
THE AGE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
Scott T. Luan† 
This article critiques and refines the subject-matter eligibility 
inquiry in patent law by examining the process of creativity in the 
context of software-implemented inventions.  As a substantive critique 
of § 101 jurisprudence, this article, informed by copyright law, 
proposes a working hypothesis for a general structure of the subject-
matter eligibility inquiry in which a critical determination is the 
appropriate level of abstraction for claim construction. As a discursive 
critique of the limits and limitations of judicial language, this article 
argues that courts have incorrectly presumed that contemporary legal 
thought is equipped, conceptually and linguistically, to understand the 
full significance of modern technologies and the grammars of their 
creation. Closely reading the human agency and design choices that 
inhere in technology, this article seeks to resolve the open questions 
posed by Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., to 
harmonize Diamond v. Diehr and Parker v. Flook, and to refine Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l. 
  
 † J.D., December 2014, The George Washington University Law School.  BS, MS, 
Stanford University. The author is a patent examiner at the United States Patent & Trademark 
Office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the official 
position, policy, or views of the Patent Office, the United States Department of Commerce, or the 
United States Government. The author will continue to perform his duties as a patent examiner in 
accordance with all applicable guidelines, rules, and regulations. I would like to thank Professors 
Dennis Karjala, Kenneth J. Rodriguez, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, and Ralph Oman for their helpful 
comments on this article. All errors are mine.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For over two centuries, statutory language describing patentable 
subject matter has remained largely unchanged. The Patent Act of 1790 
provided that “any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device” 
is eligible subject matter.1 The Patent Act of 1793, adopting categories 
that are mostly operative today, provided that “any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter” is patentable.2 More 
than 150 years later, the Patent Act of 1952 merely substituted the term 
“process” for “art.”3 The statutory language remains unchanged in the 
Smith–Leahy Act of 2011.4 
The extraordinary constancy of the statutory language delimiting 
patentable subject matter is even more striking in the context of 
technological developments that span two centuries.5 The statutory 
 1. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12. 
 2. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23. 
 3. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101) 
(“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 4. However, the America Invents Act (AIA) provides that “no patent may issue on a claim 
directed to or encompassing a human organism.” See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Public 
Law 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284 (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 5. Karl Marx’s prophetic vision of the revolutionary nature of modern technologies is 
worth quoting at length:  
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of 
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole 
relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, 
was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. 
Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch 
from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air . . . 
KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 12 (Wildside Press LLC, 
2008). Note also that the term “cloud computing” in the title of this article is merely a catchy 
marketing slogan for a decades-old technology utilizing the server-client networked architecture 
to provide Internet-based services. “Cloud technology” is catchy precisely because it expresses 
the widely-felt sense that our experience with computer technology has lost its solidity and 
concreteness. Articulation of this sense is more difficult than sloganeering. Notwithstanding the 
title, I will attempt to articulate this sense in my treatment of the developing jurisprudence on 
subject-matter eligibility. See, e.g., Katherine Hayles, The Condition of Virtuality, in LANGUAGE 
MACHINES: TECHNOLOGIES OF LITERARY AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION 183, 183–184 (Jeffrey 
Masten, Peter Stallybrass, & Nancy J. Vickers ed., 1997) (“Virtuality is the condition millions of 
people now inhabit . . . . Let me offer a strategic definition. Virtuality is the cultural perception 
that material objects are interpenetrated by information patterns . . . . When I say virtuality is a 
cultural perception, I do not mean it is merely a psychological phenomenon. It is also a mindset 
that finds instantiation in an array of powerful technologies. The perception facilities the 
development of the technologies, and the technologies reinforce the perception.”).  
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language has survived the First and Second Industrial Revolutions6 and 
the Digital Revolution. As development of technology is heralding a 
Third Industrial Revolution,7 the statutory language remains seemingly 
transcendent. 
The apparent stability and clarity of the statutory language is made 
possible by the evolving jurisprudence on subject-matter eligibility. 
Courts have attempted to define extra-statutory exclusions to eligible 
subject matter by introducing ambiguous and equivocal terms.8 Until 
the twentieth century, these judicially-created exclusions were 
commonly articulated as laws, agencies, powers and properties of 
nature, principles, scientific facts, abstractions, naked ideas, mental 
processes, intellectual processes or operations, and conceptions of the 
mind.9 In a landmark decision that defines the jurisprudence today on 
eligible subject matter, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
held as unpatentable “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.”10  
A specter is haunting legal discourse. Scholars have lamented the 
difficult philosophical and metaphysical nature of the term abstract and 
its questionable provenance in patent law.11 Courts have also 
 5. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 6. The Third Industrial Revolution, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012), http:// 
www.economist.com/node/21553017 (“The first industrial revolution began in Britain in the late 
18th century, with the mechanisation of the textile industry . . . . The second industrial revolution 
came in the early 20th century, when Henry Ford mastered the moving assembly line and ushered 
in the age of mass production.”) (emphases added). 
 7. Id. (“A number of remarkable technologies are converging: clever software, novel 
materials, more dexterous robots, new processes (notably three-dimensional printing) and a whole 
range of web-based services . . . . The factory of the future will focus on mass customization . . . . 
Now a product can be designed on a computer and ‘printed’ on a 3D printer. . . . The applications 
of 3D printing are especially mind-boggling.”).  
 8. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1948) 
(“For these are vague and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation.”). 
 9. See Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of 
Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 788 (2008) (citing case law for 
each exclusion). 
 10. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).  
 11. See, e.g., William Michael Schuster, Predictability and Patentable Processes: The 
Federal Circuit’s In re Bilski Decision and its Effect on the Incentive to Invent, 11 COLUM. SA. & 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (“Specifically, inherently difficult metaphysical questions such as 
‘What is an abstract idea?’ or ‘What is the claimed invention?’ are not the expertise of judges or 
patent examiners but rather philosophers.”); Donald S. Chisum, Patenting Intangible Methods: 
Revisiting Benson (1972) After Bilski (2010), 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 
445, 452 (2011) (observing that “most distressingly, the Court’s exclusion of ‘abstract intellectual 
concepts’ stems from an out-of-context combination of two statements from old cases that did not 
even involve intangible processes. The first statement—’an idea of itself is not patentable’—is 
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recognized difficulties associated with the term. For example, Justice 
Frankfurter characterized terms such as “abstract principles” to be 
“vague and malleable” and “infected with too much ambiguity and 
equivocation.”12 Justice Stevens argued that the Supreme Court has 
never adequately defined the term abstract idea.13 The Federal Circuit, 
as Judge Rader observed, “will not presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond 
the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit 
itself so manifestly.”14 Similarly, District Court Judge Wu for the Ninth 
Circuit recently suggested that “the two-step test [identifying an 
abstract idea] may be more like a one-step test evocative of Justice 
Stewart’s most famous phrase [‘I know it when I see it . . . .’].”15 
What is at stake cannot be underestimated. In Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l, the problematic term abstract figured as a critical notion in 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the computer-implemented invention 
at issue.16 Yet, the term abstract remains undefined. According to the 
Amicus Brief submitted by IEEE-USA, “[t]here are nearly 1 million 
software-related U.S. patents in force today on which the public 
relies.”17 However, according to IEEE-USA, there is “widespread 
misunderstanding among lawyers, judges, and commentators about the 
from the 1874 Rubber-Tip Pencil decision. The second statement—’a principle, in the abstract’ is 
not patentable—is from the 1852 Le Roy opinion. The tenor of the two cases is, contrary to the 
implication of Benson, a positive one: that an ‘idea’ or a ‘principle’ is patentable when applied to 
create a novel and useful process or product even though the idea or principle itself is not 
patentable because it is either well known or too abstract.”) (citations omitted). 
 12. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 135. 
 13. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court, in 
sum, never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea.”). 
 14. Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 15. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. 2:14-cv-00154-GW-AJW, slip op. at 
4–5 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 4, 2014) (“Thus, so far, the two-part test for identifying an abstract idea 
appears to be of limited utility, while comparisons to previously adjudicated patents—or more 
precisely, to past cases’ characterizations of those patent—have done the heavy lifting.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 16. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 17. Brief of Amicus Curiae IEEE-USA in Support of Neither Party, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd 
v. CLS Bank Int’l 2 (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/13-298_np_amcu_ieee.authcheckdam.pdf; see 
also Big US Tech Companies Face Major Patent Losses in the Post-Alice World, IAM Research 
Reveals, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog 
/Detail.aspx?g=2028b324-2d4a-4523-9f0d-f0773b8b3fa1 (“[A]ccording to ktMINE 49% of all 
IBM’s US patent holdings could be affected by the Alice decision, as could 58% of Google’s, 
55% of Microsoft’s and a whopping 76% of Oracle’s . . . it is important to remember that 
ktMINE’s findings are indicative only and that no individual patents were looked at during the 
research process; while being potentially affected by Alice does not automatically imply either 
invalidity or unenforceability. That said, the figures are stark . . . .”). 
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nature of the innovations produced by the economically dynamic and 
vibrant software industry.”18 This article attempts to clarify the 
widespread misunderstanding by examining the nature of software 
innovations from a technological perspective. 
Relevant to the attempt to understand emerging technologies is 
Gertrude Stein’s observation that there is always a lag between our 
world and our conceptions.19 For example, consider the battle plan 
conceived by World War I generals who envisioned “a nineteenth-
century war . . . to be fought with twentieth-century weapons.”20 
According to one scholar, in her explication of Stein, “we are, each and 
every one of us, nimble citizens of an always newly technologized, 
mediated world that hasn’t yet entered, much less altered, our 
categories of thought.”21 For Stein, “every generation composes and 
explains its life in terms developed by people who did not see what they 
now see or do what they now do.”22 Stated differently, technological 
reality defies common sense.23  
Our metaphors strain to capture the distinctive qualities of 
computer technology. Computers seem to be of a different order than 
 18. IEEE-USA Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 3. 
 19. Similarly, Thorstein Veblen observed that “[a]s always, the language employed [to 
describe economic reality] and the principles acted on lag behind the facts.” THORSTEIN VEBLEN, 
ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA 5 
(Augustus M. Kelley 1964) (1923) (“[Economic] matters are still spoken of in terms handed down 
from the past, and law and custom still run in terms that are fit to describe a past situation and 
conform to the logic of a bygone alignment of forces.”).  
 20. Gertrude Stein, Composition as Explanation, in GERTRUDE STEIN: WRITINGS, 1903 TO 
1932, at 520, 529 (Catherine R. Stimpson & Harriet Chessman ed., 1998). Similarly, John Reid, 
the former British secretary of state for defense, once remarked that “[w]e risk continuing to fight 
a twenty-first-century conflict with twentieth-century rules.”  
 21. Adalaide Morris, New Media Poetics: As We May Think/How to Write, in NEW MEDIA 
POETICS: CONTEXT, TECHNOTEXTS, AND THEORIES 1, 2 (2006); See also ISAIAH BERLIN, KARL 
MARX: HIS LIFE AND ENVIRONMENT 118 (1963) (“The history of society is the history of the 
inventive labours that alter man, alter his desires, habits, outlook, relationships both to other men 
and to physical nature, with which man is in perpetual physical and technological metabolism.”). 
 22. Morris, supra note 21, at 1–2 (observing that “[t]he most interesting thinkers about 
contemporary media are those who, like Stein, insist on a knowledge that exceeds current 
conceptual categories: the embodied knowledge, in our era, of a world in which children grow up 
playing with toys that have as much computing power as the giant IBM computers that sold for 
millions of dollars a generation ago.”). 
 23. Noting the various ways in which technology defies common sense, this article 
provides support for Professor Feenberg’s observation that “[t]hough we may be competent at 
using many technologies, most of what we think we know about technology in general is false.” 
Andrew Feenberg, Ten Paradoxes of Technology, 14 TECHNÉ 3 (2010) (summarizing “many of 
the conclusions philosophy of technology has reached reflecting on the reality of our technological 
world. These conclusions appear as paradoxes judged from our everyday perspective. . . . It turns 
out that most of our common sense ideas about technology are wrong.”). See infra notes 113, 181, 
192, 241, 269, 290, 318.  
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player pianos.24 The “basic tool” conception of computer programs 
seems, upon closer scrutiny, wrong as a factual matter or inconsistent 
with the principles of patent law.25 Processors, inherently 
programmable, seem to elude the bright-line categories of general-
purpose or specialized machines.26 The practice of coding seems 
 24. See, e.g., Marshall Dann, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Petitioner, v. 
Thomas R. Johnston, Respondent., 1975 WL 173465 (U.S.), 46–47 (“Petitioner’s ‘new use’ case 
culminates in a self-serving and deceptive metaphor which compares the stored computer program 
with recording devices such as the piano roll in the player piano.”). Contra Robert Gottschalk, 
Comm’r of Patents v. Benson, 1972 WL 136228 (U.S.), 5 (U.S., 2004) (“The computer does not 
acquire a new function, in any sense recognizable by the patent law, every time it is programmed 
to perform a different set of arithmetical calculations, any more than a player piano acquires a 
new function each time it plays a new song.”). The metaphor of the player-piano roll to describe 
software is deficient because the difference between the player piano and the computer is not a 
difference of degree but rather a difference in kind. Nobody would deny that computers have 
transformed the global economy. Nobody would maintain that player pianos have been similarly 
transformative. Yet, the “piano roll blues” argument remains in currency despite all that we seem 
to know about computers. But “[w]hat is it that we know but do not yet know we know?” Morris, 
supra note 21, at 2–3 (observing a difference between knowledge that is embodied “in our 
fingertips and attention spans, habits, suspicions, and predilections” and more mediated 
knowledge that is “book knowledge, cultural doxa, canonical convictions, and common sense.”) 
(emphasis added). A more problematic epistemology, as this article suggests, can perhaps be 
approached by a critical inquiry into our discourse and language. See, e.g., WENDY HUI KYONG 
CHUN, PROGRAMMED VISIONS, SOFTWARE ANDMEMORY 4 (2011) (“[S]oftware has become a 
metaphor for the mind, for culture, for ideology, for biology, and for the economy. . . . Cognitive 
science, as Paul Edwards has shown, initially comprehended the brain/mind in terms of 
hardware/software. Molecular biology conceives of DNA as a series of genetic ‘programs.’ More 
broadly, culture itself has been posited as ‘software,’ in opposition to nature, which is ‘hardware.’ 
Although technologies, such as clocks and steam engines, have historically been used 
metaphorically to conceptualize our bodies and culture, software is unique in its status as 
metaphor for metaphor itself. As a universal imitator/machine, it encapsulates a logic of general 
substitutability . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 25. Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 983 
(1985–1986) (observing that “[p]atents are regularly allowed for processes and structures that 
have primary and even sole utility in research, including chemical processes, electrical apparatus, 
and optical instruments. Literally, a microscope is a ‘basic tool’ for scientific work, but surely no 
one would assert that a new type of microscope lay beyond the scope of the patent system.”). But 
see, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work.”).  
 26. But see, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We have held that such programming creates a new 
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once 
it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program 
software.”). The distinction between general and special-purpose machines is a curious 
compounding of errors. As a technical error, the distinction overlooks technologies (e.g., field-
programmable gate arrays) that exemplify the principle of hardware–software equivalence. As an 
analytical error, the distinction attempts to anchor a seemingly objective criterion on two relative 
terms—namely, general and special. As a category error, the distinction confuses a thing with the 
condition for its possibility: A computer can effect its special purpose (i.e., execute its program) 
only because of its a priori condition of being general-purposed (i.e., programmable). See infra 
 
13_ARTICLE_LUAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2015  11:27 PM 
320 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
categorically different from mathematics and science and code seems 
much more than merely instructions to be executed on a computer.27 
Yet, we lack the proper language.  
This article critiques Alice by relying on concepts that have 
informed computer science since the closing years of the twentieth 
century. The writings of Christopher Alexander, a noted architect, have 
profoundly influenced the field of computer science and the creative 
process of writing software. Alexander sought a new language, a 
pattern language, to understand the architecture of buildings. The 
architectural abstractions of software yield to a similar 
understanding—an understanding that, as this article argues, can be 
articulated in terms of design choice. Suggesting a new governing 
metaphor that is analytically useful and descriptively accurate, this 
article analogizes software abstractions to the architecture of buildings 
in order to imbue the intangible with a materiality that seems necessary 
to our contemporary, lagging imaginations.28 
Part I critiques Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc.29 To the extent that Alice relies heavily on the Mayo framework, 
Alice suffers from the same problems as Mayo. Taking as a point of 
departure the analytical fiction that an abstract idea should be treated 
as if it were known in the prior art, this part will examine Mayo’s 
problematic harmonization of Flook and Diehr. Mayo’s harmonization 
poses open questions that remain unanswered in Alice: Is the eligibility 
note 306 and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., HAROLD ABELSON, GERALD JAY SUSSMAN & JULIE SUSSMAN, STRUCTURE 
AND INTERPRETATION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS xviii (1996) (“Underlying our approach to this 
subject is our conviction that ‘computer science’ is not a science and that its significance has little 
to do with computers. The computer revolution is a revolution in the way we think and in the way 
we express what we think. The essence of this change is the emergence of what might best be 
called procedural epistemology—the study of the structure of knowledge from an imperative point 
of view, as opposed to the more declarative point of view taken by classical mathematical subjects. 
Mathematics provides a framework for dealing precisely with notions of ‘what is.’ Computation 
provides a framework for dealing precisely with notions of ‘how to.’”); Peter Kroes & Anthonie 
Meijers, Reply to Critics, 6 TECHNÉ 112 (2002) (“In contrast to science, engineering (technology) 
is not geared to representing the world, but to changing the world and to making technical 
artifacts . . . . It seems that traditional epistemology has not taken this basic difference between 
science and technology seriously; a systematic analysis of engineering knowledge is virtually non-
existent (the reason for this may be that often it is tacitly assumed that engineering knowledge is 
some form of applied scientific knowledge, which leads to the conclusion that the model of 
knowledge as justified true belief is also applicable to engineering knowledge).”). 
 28. This analogy can be understood as part of a more difficult aspect of the article—that is, 
a critical inquiry into our language and discourse. As a discursive critique about the limits and 
limitations of our language, this aspect of the article is necessarily a more difficult project than 
the substantive critique which proposes to refine Mayo’s framework. 
 29. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1291 (2012). 
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inquiry, as a relative functional concern, based on predictable guiding 
principles?30 How should courts resolve the methodological tension in 
eligibility inquiry between the “as-a-whole” analysis and analytical 
dissection?31 What is the “something more” that is required to 
transform a claimed invention into eligible subject matter?32 What is an 
abstract idea?33 
Part II seeks answers to the questions posed by Mayo in copyright 
law. This part explicates and critiques Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. 
v. Altai, Inc., the leading case on analyzing computer programs in 
copyright law.34 Notably, this part does not attempt to clarify the 
relative roles of patent and copyright protection of computer 
programs.35 Rather, this part argues for a more modest proposition—
that the jurisprudence on the copyrightability of software can inform 
the jurisprudence on patent eligibility of software-implemented 
inventions.36 Specifically, this part establishes that Altai articulates two 
 30. It is the burden of this article to show that understanding creativity as design choice 
(that inter alia encodes tradeoffs between benefits and costs) yields predictable guiding principles. 
See infra notes 236–251 and accompanying text.  
 31. This article argues that constitutive design choices can be fruitfully analyzed, at the 
appropriate level of abstraction, in terms of their degree of technical necessity in light of the 
whole. See infra notes 186–201 and accompanying text.  
 32. This article argues that the well-accepted principle that the whole must exceed the sum 
of the parts, as articulated by Mayo, calls not for arithmetic but for explication. The excess cannot 
exist apart from the inquiry. See infra notes 125–130 and accompanying text.  
 33. To be sure, some abstract ideas are undeniably fundamental building blocks of human 
ingenuity. This article argues that less fundamental abstract ideas at lower levels of abstraction 
(that may also be building blocks) can be fruitfully characterized as abstractions. Explicating the 
software architectures at issue in Altai and Alice, this article argues that, in the specific context of 
the eligibility inquiry, abstraction is semantically manifold—abstraction is at once a noun and a 
verb. In other words, abstractions are the products of the creative act of abstraction. See infra notes 
148–156 and accompanying text.  
 34. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 35. The problem of coordination between copyright and patent law to find the optimal 
social policy balance of legal protection for computer software has already been examined in legal 
scholarship. For example, Professor Karlaja compelling argues that copyright law is not well-
suited to protect the functional and structural aspects of computer programs. See, e.g., Dennis S. 
Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 73 (1998) (arguing that “[c]opyright protection for 
functional but nonliteral program elements, such as SSO [structure, sequence, and organization] 
and functional aspects of interfaces would represent an unnecessary and indeed unfortunate 
intrusion into the subject matter of patent law.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and 
Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439 (2002–2003); Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent 
Theory For The Copyright Protection Of Computer Software And Recent Judicial Interpretations, 
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (1998). 
 36. Readers are invited to draw their own conclusions about the relative roles of the two 
bodies of law based on the truth of this proposition. Admittedly, this article suggests a degree of 
(potential) analytical redundancy or overlap between copyright and patent law, which may 
provide further support for Professor Karjala’s thesis that copyright protection of computer 
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critical insights about the nature of software—namely, that software 
can embody multiple ideas at different levels of abstraction and that 
software is the product of design choices. Relying on the pattern 
language of software design and Alexander’s architectural patterns, 
this part also critiques and refines Altai by arguing that Altai overlooks 
the hidden interior of software architecture, an architecture that is 
structured by design choices. This part serves as the basis for a critique 
of § 101 jurisprudence in the subsequent parts.  
Part III revisits the questions posed by Mayo. This part argues that 
the harmonization of Flook and Diehr represents a special case of a 
more generalized structure of the eligibility inquiry that unfolds along 
three lines of analyses. Part IV argues that Alice should have been 
decided along one line of analysis rather than unfolding incorrectly 
along another line. This last part critiques Alice by relying (and 
elaborating) on the concepts developed in the article.  
I. OPEN QUESTIONS IN MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVS. V. 
PROMETHEUS LABS., INC. 
Decided at the dawn of the Information Age, the Benson, Flook, 
and Diehr trilogy remains foundational in the developing jurisprudence 
on subject-matter eligibility, for better or for worse.37 In the trilogy, the 
Supreme Court struggled with a question that is still largely unresolved 
today: how and when does a discovery of an abstract idea, scientific 
truth, or mathematical principle become a patentable invention?  
In its attempt to harmonize Flook and Diehr, Mayo advanced 
§ 101 jurisprudence. Unlike Bilski, which relied too heavily on the 
undefined term “abstract,”38 Mayo sought to clarify analytical 
programs should be reduced. Note also that the truth of the proposition does not mean that 
copyright jurisprudence should be taken at face value. This article takes Altai only as a starting 
point because Altai allows for a definition of abstraction that is analytically useful. Critiquing 
Altai, this article will argue that abstraction is really about (design) choice which, in turn, is 
fundamental to creativity. Thus, this article can be read as an argument pace Karjala that an 
inquiry into creativity should enter directly into the eligibility analysis because creativity itself 
clarifies (rather than muddles) the analysis. But see Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 
15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 173 (2008) (“[C]reativity itself is not analytically useful in making 
the most basic determination of whether the creativity under consideration falls within copyright 
subject matter, patent subject matter, or neither.”). See infra notes 170–182 and accompanying 
text.  
 37. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 38. “[The claims] are attempts to patent abstract ideas. Indeed, all members of the Court 
agree that the patent application at issue here falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract 
idea. . . . The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in 
claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook. 
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difficulties in the trilogy.39 However, Mayo’s harmonization poses 
open questions. This part examines these questions which, as the 
following parts show, suggest a refinement of the eligibility inquiry. 
This part takes as a point of departure the analytical fiction that an 
abstract idea should be treated as if it were known in the prior art. The 
analytical fiction serves to reveal the conceptual difficulties in drawing 
terminological and methodological distinctions between the eligibility 
and patentability inquiries.  
Analytical fictions obscure conceptual difficulties. Mayo 
questioned the awkward and well-established analytical fiction that an 
abstract idea should be treated as if it were known in the prior art.40 The 
analytical fiction was first articulated in an English case and was 
subsequently adopted by American courts.41 By subscribing to the 
analytical fiction, courts have introduced an additional and artificial 
requirement for doctrinal consistency.42 Specifically, the analytical 
fiction has complicated courts’ attempts to draw terminological and 
methodological distinctions between the eligibility and patentability 
inquires. In regards to the terminological question, by subscribing to 
the analytical fiction that abstract ideas always lack novelty, courts are 
Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and 
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea. . . . Petitioners’ remaining claims are 
broad examples of how hedging can be used in commodities and energy markets. Flook 
established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution 
components did not make the concept patentable. That is exactly what the remaining claims in 
petitioners’ application do. These claims attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea of hedging 
risk in the energy market and then instruct the use of well-known random analysis techniques to 
help establish some of the inputs into the equation. Indeed, these claims add even less to the 
underlying abstract principle than the invention in Flook did, for the Flook invention was at least 
directed to the narrower domain of signaling dangers in operating a catalytic converter. Today, 
the Court once again declines to impose limitations on the Patent Act that are inconsistent with 
the Act’s text. The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the 
unpatentability of abstract ideas.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609–12 (2010) (emphases 
added). 
 39. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1300 
(2012) (characterizing Flook and Diehr as “two cases in which the Court reached opposite 
conclusions about the patent eligibility of processes that embodied the equivalent of natural 
laws.”). 
 40. Id. at 1304 (“Intuitively, one would suppose that a newly discovered law of nature is 
novel. The Government, however, suggests in effect that the novelty of a component law of nature 
may be disregarded when evaluating the novelty of the whole. See Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 27. But §§ 102 and 103 say nothing about treating laws of nature as if they were 
part of the prior art when applying those sections.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Neilson v. Harford, Web. Pat. Cases 295, 371 (1844); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 
U.S. 62, 115 (1853); Flook, 437 U.S. at 592. 
 42. Professor Chisum characterized this analytical fiction as “aberrational.” See Donald S. 
Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 994–95 (1985–86) (“That 
aberration was so basically antithetical to patent law principles that it would have to be purged.”). 
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tacitly advancing the position that there is some analytical 
commingling of eligibility and patentability. In regards to the 
methodological question, by treating as prior art the portion of the 
claim that recites an abstract idea, courts are implicitly advocating for 
analytical dissection. However, such tacit and implicit positions are far 
from settled in the developing jurisprudence on subject-matter 
eligibility. 
The jurisprudence on subject-matter eligibility attempted to draw 
terminological distinctions between the eligibility and patentability 
inquires. In Flook, the Court first articulated the § 101 requirement of 
“new and useful” as an “inventive concept in its application.”43 The 
“inventive concept” formulation has gained wide currency.44 However, 
Judge Rich argued that “confusion creeps in through such phrases.”45 
In his critique of Flook, Judge Rich argued in In re Bergy that the Court 
had erred in “commingling of distinct statutory provisions which are 
conceptually unrelated.”46 Rich maintained that “[n]otwithstanding the 
words ‘new and useful’ in § 101, the invention is not examined under 
that statute for novelty because that is not the statutory scheme of things 
or the long-established administrative practice.”47 Judge Rich, relying 
on legislative history, argued that “in 1952 Congress voiced its intent 
to consider the novelty of an invention under § 102 where it is first 
made clear what the statute means by ‘new’, notwithstanding the fact 
that this requirement is first named  in § 101.”48 In other words, “[o]f 
the three requirements stated in § 101, only two, utility and statutory 
subject matter, are applied under § 101.”49   
Diehr echoed Judge Rich’s critique of Flook. Diehr cited In re 
Bergy to stand for the proposition that the question of “whether a 
particular invention is novel is wholly apart from whether the invention 
falls into a category of statutory subject matter.”50 Relying on the same 
legislative history as cited by Judge Rich, Diehr argued that the 
question of novelty is properly characterized as a § 102 analysis even 
 43. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594. 
 44. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 45. Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom., 
See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 46. Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d at 959. 
 47. Id. at 960. 
 48. Id. at 961. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (citing In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961).  
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though the statutory language of § 101 includes the term “new.”51 Diehr 
reasoned that the language of § 101 is merely “a general statement of 
the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection ‘subject 
to the conditions and requirements of this title [such as novelty].’”52 
The legislative history reveals that the language of § 102 is, in effect, 
an “amplification” and “definition” of the term “new” in § 101.53 In 
short, consistent with Judge Rich's analysis of the legislative history, 
Diehr concluded that “[a] rejection on either of these [anticipation and 
obviousness] grounds does not affect the determination that 
respondents’ claims recited subject matter which was eligible for patent 
protection under § 101.”54  
However, Mayo allowed for the possibility that the relationship 
between the eligibility and patentability inquiries cannot be clarified by 
a simple, terminological, bright-line rule. Contrary to Judge Rich's 
absolutism that “[t]o provide the option of making such a [anticipation] 
rejection under either § 101 or § 102 is confusing and therefore bad 
law,”55 Mayo adopted a more nuanced approach. Mayo observed that 
“in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-
eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes 
overlap.”56 Mayo reasoned that allocating the determination of novelty 
entirely to § 102 “risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, 
while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not 
equipped to do.”57 Thus, Mayo stands for the proposition that the 
determination of novelty serves different purposes in the eligibility and 
patentability inquiries. According to Mayo, the underlying purpose of 
the eligibility inquiry is to determine “how much future innovation is 
foreclosed relative to the contribution of the inventor.”58 Accordingly, 
Mayo characterized the eligibility inquiry as a relative functional 
concern.59 An open question remains whether the relative functional 
 51. “The corresponding section of [the] existing statute is split into two sections, section 
101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be obtained, and section 102 defining 
statutory novelty and stating other conditions for patentability.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (citations 
omitted). 
 52. Id. at 189. 
 53. Id. at 190–91 (citations omitted). 
 54. Id. at 191. 
 55. Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom., 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), aff’d sub nom., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303 (1980). 
 56. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1303.  
 59. Id. (“[T]he underlying functional concern here is a relative one . . . .”). 
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concern is based on predictable guiding principles or merely a license 
for a free-ranging inquiry. 
The methodological distinction between the eligibility and 
patentability inquiries has also been a source of conceptual difficulty. 
For example, Flook opined that the eligibility inquiry should consider 
the claim as a whole.60 However, in practice, Flook analytically 
dissected the claim at issue by considering whether each of the recited 
steps was well known.61 By contrast, Diehr cautioned that “[i]t is 
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements … new 
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all 
the constituents of the combination were well known . . . .”62 Mayo 
acknowledged the methodological tension between “as-a-whole” 
analysis and analytical dissection by submitting that the eligibility 
inquiry is as much about the claim as a whole as about the claim's 
constituent parts. Relying on the well-established formulation that the 
whole must exceed the sum of the parts,63 Mayo reasoned that the claim 
at issue is ineligible subject matter because the “[claimed] steps, when 
viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their 
parts taken separately.”64 However, open questions remain about how 
the “sum [of the parts]” and “[the claim as a] whole” are to be 
determined. The mereology of claimed inventions remains undefined.  
Mayo poses the question of how a critical difference (i.e., between 
the “sum” and the “whole”) should be conceived. Mayo suggests that 
the critical difference can be characterized as an “integration.”65 But 
this does not get us very far. If “integration” is a measure of (necessary) 
 60. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“Our approach to respondent’s application 
is, however, not at all inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole. 
Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a mathematical 
algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior 
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention.”). 
 61. Id. (“The chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are well 
known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the use of alarm limits to 
trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use 
of computers for ‘automatic monitoring-alarming.’”). 
 62. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
 63. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 
(1950) (“The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when 
the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices 
patentable.”). 
 64. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 65. Id. (“The Court pointed out that the basic mathematical equation, like a law of nature, 
was not patentable. But it found the overall process patent eligible because of the way the 
additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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involvement, then the post-solution steps in both Flook and Diehr 
“integrate” their respective formulas into a process as a whole because 
the steps are dictated by the terms of the formulas, as discussed below. 
If “integration” is a measure of synergistic or emergent advantage, then 
the post-solution steps in both Flook and Diehr “integrate” their 
respective formulas into a process as a whole because the steps enable 
the formulas to acquire a new potency in the world (to control the 
processes of rubber-curing and catalytic conversion). (Or, does Mayo 
suggest an “integration” that is a different calculus of sums?) 
Therefore, Mayo does not adequately resolve the methodological 
tension between the “as-a-whole” analysis and analytical dissection.  
This article attempts to answer the questions posed by Mayo. This 
article argues that the eligibility inquiry, as a relative functional 
concern, is not a free-ranging inquiry but rather one that is (or can be) 
guided by principles that reflect an understanding of the creative 
process. This article also argues that the relationship between the whole 
and the parts of a claim can only be properly appreciated at the 
appropriate level of abstraction. These answers are found in copyright 
law, the topic of the following part. As a segue to the following part, 
the discussion will now focus on why Mayo’s harmonization of Flook 
and Diehr is problematic in a way that is corrigible by insights from 
copyright law. 
Mayo’s harmonization of Flook and Diehr is problematic. For 
example, Mayo’s articulation of the requisite qualities for patent 
eligibility remains vague and tautological. Mayo never explicitly 
clarified what is required to “transform[] the [claimed] process into an 
inventive application of the formula.”66 Mayo simply concluded that 
“[t]hese other steps [in Diehr] apparently added to the formula 
something that in terms of patent law's objectives had significance.”67 
However, this significant, inventive “something” is far from apparent 
because Mayo's reasoning is tautological:68 A patent-eligible 
application of a formula that is inventive and significant has 
“something” that is necessary for patent eligibility. In other words, an 
 66. Id. at 1299. 
 67. Id. (emphases added).  
 68. The tautological reasoning in Mayo recalls the circular reasoning in Benson. See 
Donald S. Chisum, Patenting Intangible Methods: Revisiting Benson (1972) After Bilski (2010), 
27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 454 (2011) (“In the ‘nutshell,’ the Court’s 
reasoning is circular. The applicants Benson and Tabbot asked for a claim to the algorithm itself 
as a new and useful process that did not reflect any natural law or scientific truth. The Court 
responded to this question, in effect saying: the claim to an algorithm cannot be allowed because 
if it is, the claim will be to the algorithm [which is ineligible subject matter].”). 
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application of a formula is eligible subject matter because it has the 
requisite qualities for patent eligibility.  
Further, Mayo’s characterization of the claimed invention in 
Flook could be applied with equal validity to that in Diehr.69 Mayo 
correctly observed that the post-solution steps in Flook (e.g., 
monitoring variables, recomputing and readjusting alarm limit value) 
were well-known, conventional, and obvious.70 In fact, the post-
solution steps in Flook are dictated by the terms of the equation.71 The 
equation at issue in Flook is known in the signal-processing art as an 
“exponential smoothing” filter that, over time, assigns exponentially 
decreasing weights to past observations of a given signal.72 Signal-
processing filters, by definition, monitor input variable(s) and update 
output(s). Similarly, in Diehr, the post-solution steps are also dictated 
by the terms of the equation at issue.73 The steps include “installing 
rubber [characterized by activation energy constant, C] in a press, 
closing the mold [characterized by a geometric constant, x], constantly 
determining the temperature of the mold [temperature variable, Z], 
constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time [cure time variable, 
 69. In his dissent in Diehr, Justice Stevens arrived at a similar conclusion. Stevens argued 
that “[t]here is no suggestion that there is anything novel in the instrumentation of the mold, in 
actuating a timer when the press is closed, or in automatically opening the press when the 
computed time expires. Nor does the application suggest that Diehr and Lutton have discovered 
anything about the temperatures in the mold or the amount of curing time that will produce the 
best cure. What they claim to have discovered, in essence, is a method of updating the original 
estimated curing time by repetitively recalculating that time pursuant to a well-known 
mathematical formula in response to variations in temperature within the mold. Their method of 
updating the curing time calculation is strikingly reminiscent of the method of updating alarm 
limits that Dale Flook sought to patent.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 208–09 (1981). 
 70. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012). 
 71. “Claim 1 of the patent describes the method as follows: 1. A method for updating the 
value of at least one alarm limit on at least one process variable involved in a process comprising 
the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a current value of 
Bo + K wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm offset which 
comprises: (1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present value being 
defined as PVL; (2) Determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation: 
B1 = Bo (1.0 – F) + PVL (F) “where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 
1.0; (3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as B1 + K; and thereafter (4) 
Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.” Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596–
97 (1978). 
 72. The formula is characterized as exponential because the terms can be expanded (i.e., 
for a range of time) into a geometric progression which is a discrete version of an exponential 
function. 
 73. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 181. Note that the claim at issue in Diehr does not specify the 
frequency of the calculations. While Alice did not engage in “mental steps” analysis, post-Alice 
opinions invalidating patent claims based on “mental steps” analysis seem to overlook the fact 
that the calculations based on the Arrhenius equation can easily be performed by humans. See, 
e.g., Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, No. 2013-1663 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2014). 
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v] through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and 
automatically opening the press at the proper time [as dictated by the 
equation ln v = CZ + x].”74 Therefore, Mayo incorrectly held that, in 
Diehr, “it [is] nowhere suggested that all these [post-solution] steps, or 
at least the combination of those steps, were in context obvious, already 
in use, or purely conventional.”75  
Its problems notwithstanding, Mayo’s harmonization of Flook and 
Diehr is corrigible. According to Mayo, the claimed invention at issue 
in Flook, unlike that in Diehr, required something extra-algorithmic—
that is, additional steps that are not dictated by the terms of the 
algorithm—in order to be eligible subject matter. Mayo suggests that 
the necessary extra-algorithmic step(s) may “explain how the variables 
[e.g., weighing factor, F] used in the formula were selected” or describe 
“the means of setting off an alarm.”76 In contrast, the patent-eligible 
claim at issue in Diehr does not need to recite directly comparable 
extra-algorithmic step(s) that explain how the variables (e.g., geometric 
constant, x) used in the formula were selected or the means of opening 
the press. That Mayo required something extra-algorithmic in Flook but 
not in Diehr suggests that there is a critical difference between the two 
formulas. Mayo suggests that the difference lies in the level of 
generality or abstractness.77  
As a description of an underlying principle, the term 
“abstractness” is related to but distinct from “narrowness.” While both 
concepts relate to the applicability of a given principle, the concept of 
“abstractness” can be understood formally while “narrowness” can be 
understood substantively. A principle is abstract because its 
generalized formulation allows for wide applicability independent of 
particular contexts.78 For example, unlike the formula at issue in Diehr, 
the “smoothing” formula in Flook defines relationships among more 
abstract variables that are less directly connected to physical 
phenomena, processes, or quantities. For instance, the process variable 
(PVL) can be any variable within any process. In Diehr, the formula at 
 74. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. 
 75. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012) 
(“Other cases offer further support for the view that simply appending conventional steps, 
specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas 
cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”).  
 78. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1097, 1127 (2011) (observing that courts often confuse vagueness with abstraction and 
submitting that “an idea is abstract if it lacks specific context”).  
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issue describes functional relationships among specific variables in a 
rubber-curing process.79 For example, the temperature variable (Z) can 
only represent the temperature of the mold. Accordingly, the 
“smoothing” formula in Flook can be characterized as more abstract 
than the equation in Diehr.   
By contrast, a formula is narrow because it applies, in substance, 
only to limited phenomenon. Mayo correctly characterized the 
principle at issue as narrower compared to Einstein’s law of relativity.80 
The principle at issue in Mayo narrowly describes drug-induced 
physiological phenomenon (i.e., the level of 6–thioguanine in a 
subject).81 Einstein’s law of relativity is less narrow because it 
describes a wider range of phenomenon. Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity applies to any physical phenomenon in which effects of 
gravitation are significant. However, narrower principles or formulas 
may nevertheless be more abstract. For example, Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity is arguably less abstract than the narrower 
“smoothing” formula in Flook because the terms in Einstein’s theory 
correspond to physical quantities (e.g., speed of light) and its solutions 
correspond to actual physical phenomenon (e.g., curvature of space-
time).  
Mayo observed that “our cases have not distinguished among 
different laws of nature according to whether or not the principles they 
embody are sufficiently narrow. And this is understandable. Courts and 
judges are not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of 
judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature.”82 By 
contrast, as discussed in the following part, copyright law routinely 
distinguishes ideas in terms of abstractness. Informed by copyright law, 
Parts III and IV will examine how the notion of abstractness (i.e., level 
of abstraction) can harmonize Flook and Diehr, serve as the basis for a 
critique of Alice, and refine the subject-matter eligibility inquiry in 
patent law. 
II. ANALYSIS OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN COPYRIGHT LAW  
Part II.A establishes that Altai articulates two critical insights 
about the nature of software. First, Altai observes that software can 
 79. The formula at issue in Diehr is a special empirical case of a more generalized 
Arrhenius equation. The Arrhenius equation, describing the temperature dependence of reaction 
rates, can be applied to other thermal processes. 
 80. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.  
 81. Id. at 1295. 
 82. Id. at 1303. 
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embody multiple ideas at different levels of abstraction. Second, Altai 
observes that software is the product of design choices. Altai’s 
observations about the nature of software will serve, in Part IV, as the 
basis for the critique of Alice.83 Using the pattern language of software 
design, Part II.B critiques and refines Altai by arguing that Altai 
overlooks the hidden interior of software architecture that is structured 
by design choices. The critique serves the larger thesis that the 
eligibility inquiry in patent law (and Alice in particular) should focus 
on what has been obscured in Altai. 
 A. Abstraction–Filtration in Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc.  
In the seminal case Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., Judge 
Learned Hand articulated the now-famous “abstraction test” regarding 
the scope of protectable subject matter in copyright law: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of 
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and 
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more 
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at 
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series 
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise 
the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never extended.84  
At the dawn of the Internet, Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc. adapted Judge Hand’s “abstraction test” to computer 
software.85 Altai articulated a three-part abstraction-filtration-
comparison test, the first part of which was derived from Hand's 
“abstraction test.” The abstraction step “resembles reverse engineering 
on a theoretical plane.”86 Stated differently, the abstraction step mirrors 
the actual process of software creation, involving an analysis that 
dissects and isolates each level of abstraction within a program's 
structure. Worth reproducing in full is the court’s description: 
As an anatomical guide to this procedure, the following description 
is helpful: At the lowest level of abstraction, a computer program 
 83. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.  
 84. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (emphases added). 
 85. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). Altai 
also relied on Professor Nimmer’s proposed test for substantial similarity of non-literal elements 
in a computer program. See David Nimmer et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the 
Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
625 (1988). 
 86. Altai, 982 F.2d at 707. 
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may be thought of in its entirety as a set of individual instructions 
organized into a hierarchy of modules. At a higher level of 
abstraction, the instructions in the lowest-level modules may be 
replaced conceptually by the functions of those modules. At 
progressively higher levels of abstraction, the functions of higher-
level modules conceptually replace the implementations of those 
modules in terms of lower-level modules and instructions, until 
finally, one is left with nothing but the ultimate function of the 
program. . . . A program has structure at every level of abstraction 
at which it is viewed. At low levels of abstraction, a program's 
structure may be quite complex; at the highest level it is trivial.87 
Thus, “to retrace and map each of the designer’s steps—in the opposite 
order in which they were taken during the program’s creation” reveals 
that software creation is a process of abstraction.88 
Relying on Hand’s “abstraction test,” Altai derived the abstraction 
step in its three-part test as a response to and a critique of Whelan 
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.89 Whelan first introduced 
the idea/expression distinction to the software context. Legal 
scholarship has, with good reasons, overwhelmingly focused on the 
deficiencies of Whelan. However, a critical insight was obscured in the 
chorus of criticisms. Whelan observed that “the coding process is a 
comparatively small part of programming. By far the larger portion of 
the expense and difficulty in creating computer programs is attributable 
to the development of the structure and logic of the program … rather 
than to the coding.”90 Whelan stands for the premise that analyses of 
computer programs must be based on an accurate understanding of the 
creative process of writing software, a premise that has underwritten, 
implicitly or explicitly, the jurisprudence on the copyrightability of 
software.   
Nevertheless, commentators have criticized Whelan for 
oversimplifying the complex nature of computer software. Whelan held 
that software embodies a single purpose or idea.91 Therefore, according 
 87. Id. at 707 (citation omitted). 
 88. Id. at 706–07 (“[T]he theoretic framework for analyzing substantial similarity 
expounded by Learned Hand in the Nichols case is helpful in the present context. In Nichols, we 
enunciated what has now become known as the ‘abstractions’ test for separating idea from 
expression . . . . While the abstractions test was originally applied in relation to literary works 
such as novels and plays, it is adaptable to computer programs. In contrast to the Whelan approach, 
the abstractions test ‘implicitly recognizes that any given work may consist of a mixture of 
numerous ideas and expressions.’”) (citation omitted). 
 89. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 90. Id. at 1231. 
 91. Id. at 1236. 
 
13_ARTICLE_LUAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2015  11:27 PM 
2015] SUBJ. MATTER ELIGIBILITY & CLOUD COMP. 333 
to Whelan, the particular means chosen for achieving the desired 
purpose—the structure, sequence and organization of the computer 
program—is protectable expression.92 Legal scholars have argued that 
Whelan overprotects computer software, renders ineffective 
“cleanroom” software development techniques, overburdens new 
entrants, and encourages inefficient divergence in the software 
technology.93  
Joining in the chorus of criticisms, Altai maintained that 
“Whelan’s general formulation that a program’s overall purpose 
equates with the program’s [single] idea is descriptively inadequate.”94 
Altai advanced the notion that ideas and expressions can be found at 
different levels of abstraction within the structure of a computer 
program. “In contrast to the Whelan approach,” Altai reasoned, “the 
abstractions test implicitly recognizes that any given work may consist 
of a mixture of numerous ideas and expressions.”95 Altai’s conception 
of software as embodying multiple ideas at different levels of 
abstraction is directly relevant to the software at issue in Alice, as Part 
IV argues.96 
The second, filtration step of the Altai test focuses on design 
choices in the creative process of writing software. Altai observed that 
“Whelan's approach to separating idea from expression in computer 
programs relies too heavily on metaphysical distinctions and does not 
place enough emphasis on practical considerations . . . . [A] satisfactory 
answer to this problem cannot be reached by resorting, a priori, to 
philosophical first principals [sic].”97 The second step of the Altai test 
separates or filters protectable expression from non-protectable 
material by examining software components at each level of abstraction 
to determine the extent of a programmer's freedom of design choice. 
Software components dictated by considerations of efficiency or 
required by external factors are nonprotectable expressions.98  
 92. Id.  
 93. See, e.g., Walter A. Effross, Assaying Computer Associates v. Altai: How Will The 
“Golden Nugget” Test Pan Out?, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 27–32 (1993). 
 94. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 95. Id. at 707 (citation omitted). 
 96. Id. at 705 (“[A] computer program’s ultimate function or purpose is the composite 
result of interacting subroutines. Since each subroutine is itself a program, and thus, may be said 
to have its own ‘idea’. . . .”).  
 97. Id. at 706. 
 98. Id. at 707 (“This [filtration] process entails examining the structural components at 
each level of abstraction to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was ‘idea’ or 
was dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; 
required by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the public domain and hence is 
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The filtration step is based on two well-established doctrines in 
copyright law. First, the filtration step is based on the merger doctrine 
articulated in Baker v. Selden.99 The merger doctrine holds that “[w]hen 
there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and its 
expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that 
expression.”100 Second, the filtration step is based on the scènes-à-faire 
doctrine. The scènes-à-faire doctrine excludes from copyright 
protection expressions that are “as a practical matter, indispensable or 
at least standard in the treatment of a given [idea].”101 In the software 
context, scènes à faire consist of standard techniques and widely-
accepted programming practices that circumscribe a programmer's 
freedom of design choice.102 While the scènes-à-faire doctrine relate to 
contexts that less severely circumscribe a programmer's freedom of 
design choice, the merger and the scènes-à-faire doctrines are both 
fundamentally concerned about design choice. This fundamental 
concern is an undercurrent in Christopher Alexander’s writings on 
architecture which have profoundly influenced the practice of software 
engineering.   
B. Critique of Altai  
1. Architecture of Buildings: The Structure of Physical 
Space 
Christopher Alexander, a noted architect, believed that the ancient 
problems of structuring physical space are often susceptible to invariant 
patterns of solutions that are as timeless as they are unconscious. In The 
Timeless Way of Building, the first volume of his three-volume treatise, 
Alexander sought to articulate this sense of timelessness.103 He 
observed: 
nonprotectable expression.”). 
 99. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (“And where the art it teaches cannot be used 
without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to 
them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given 
therewith to the public . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 100. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–08 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 
1988)). 
 101. Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Atari, Inc. 
v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 102. Altai, 982 F.2d at 709–10 (“[A] programmer’s freedom of design choice is often 
circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as . . . widely accepted programming practices 
within the computer industry.”).  
 103. CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, THE TIMELESS WAY OF BUILDING (1979). 
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There is one timeless way of building. It is a thousand years old, and 
the same today as it has ever been. The great traditional buildings of 
the past, the villages and tents and temples in which man feels at 
home, have always been made by people who were very close to the 
center of this way. . . . This does not mean that all ways of making 
buildings are identical. It means that at the core of all successful acts 
of building and at the core of all successful processes of growth, 
even though there are a million different versions of these acts and 
processes, there is one fundamental invariant feature, which is 
responsible.104 
In the second volume, A Pattern Language (1977), Alexander 
formulated a pattern language to articulate these unconscious patterns 
that are “archetypal—so deep, so deeply rooted in the nature of things, 
that it seems likely that they will be a part of human nature, and human 
action, as much in five hundred years, as they are today.”105 
Alexander’s work profoundly influenced the field of computer 
science. Alexander studied mathematics and physics at Cambridge 
University before pursuing advanced studies in architecture at Harvard 
University. A Pattern Language and The Timeless Way of Building are 
almost always cited as the genesis for the concept of patterns in a 
paradigmatic approach to computer programming that had become the 
dominant methodology by the mid-1990s.106 Just as Alexander et al. 
had proposed 253 patterns that organize physical space, the “The Gang 
of Four” (1995) proposed 23 design patterns or abstractions that 
structure conceptual space.107 The design patterns formulated by “The 
Gang of Four” are recurring solutions to common problems in software 
engineering. Scholars have noted the similarities between Alexander's 
pattern language and the notion of generative grammar for natural 
languages.108 Just as the rules of grammar can generate an infinite 
variety of sentences, so the rules of a pattern language can generate 
many possible structuring of physical or conceptual space. 
 104. Id. at 7–8. 
 105. CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE: TOWNS, BUILDINGS, 
CONSTRUCTION xvii (1977). 
 106. LESLIE J. WAGUESPACK, THRIVING SYSTEMS THEORY AND METAPHOR-DRIVEN 
MODELING 9 (2010).  
 107. ERICH GAMMA, RICHARD HELM, RAPLH JOHNSON, & JOHN VLISSIDES, DESIGN 
PATTERNS: ELEMENTS OF REUSABLE OBJECT-ORIENTED SOFTWARE 8–9 (1995) (providing a 
brief overview of 23 design patterns discussed in the book) [hereinafter GoF]. 
 108. See, e.g., Juval Portugali, Inter-representation Networks and Cognitive Mapping, in 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF COGNITIVE MAPS 11, 32 (Juval Portugali ed., 1996). Generative grammar 
originates in the seminal work of linguist Noam Chomsky. 
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Alexander is critical of the import of his notion of pattern 
language in/into computer science as merely a vehicle of 
communication, allowing programmers “to write down good ideas 
about software design in a way that can be discussed, shared, modified, 
and so forth.”109 Alexander clarifies: 
However, that is not all that pattern languages are supposed to do. 
The pattern language that we began creating in the 1970s had other 
essential features . . . it allows people to create coherence, morally 
sound objects, and encourages and enables this process because of 
its emphasis on the coherence of the created whole.110 
Of significance is Alexander’s emphasis on wholeness—a concept that 
is at once elusive and fundamental. 
According to Alexander, the structure of physical space involves 
a fundamental circularity.111 While the profound implications that 
Alexander draws from this observation are beyond the scope of this 
article,112 what directly concerns us is his conception of wholeness in 
architecture. According to Alexander, “wholeness is a structure of great 
subtlety . . . it is useless of think of it as a relationship ‘among the 
parts’ . . . . it is the wholeness which creates the parts.”113 For example, 
 109. Christopher Alexander, The Origins of Pattern Theory: The Future of the Theory, and 
the Generation of a Living World, 16 SOFTWARE, IEEE 71, 74 (Sep/Oct 1999).  
 110. Id. 
 111. “This circularity is not a mistake, or an indication of something logically vicious in the 
argument. On the contrary, it is the essential feature of the situation. Our understanding of both 
wholeness and life will come into focus at that moment when we thoroughly grasp this circularity 
and what it means.” CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, THE NATURE OF ORDER: AN ESSAY ON THE ART 
OF BUILDING AND THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE, BOOK 1—THE PHENOMENON OF LIFE 118 
(2002). 
 112. For example, contrary to the modernist vision of urban planning, as articulated by 
influential architect Le Corbusier, Alexander favors piecemeal, organic growth, a process which 
allows the whole to emerge gradually from local acts. See also RICHARD P. GABRIEL, PATTERNS 
OF SOFTWARE: TALES FROM THE SOFTWARE COMMUNITY 14 (1996) (“[H]ow do you enable a 
programmer to feel responsible for software developed earlier? Here is where habitability comes 
in. Just as with a house, you don’t have to have built or designed something to feel at home in it. 
Most people buy houses that have been built and designed by someone else. These homes are 
habitable because they are designed for habitation by people, and peoples’ needs are relatively 
similar. As I said earlier, a New England farmhouse is habitable, and the new owner feels just as 
comfortable changing or adapting that farmhouse as the first farmer was. But a home designed by 
Frank Lloyd Wright—though more habitable than most ‘overdesigned’ homes—cannot be altered 
because all its parts are too rigidly designed and built. The needs of the whole have overshadowed 
the needs of the parts and the needs of the inhabitants. Finally, if Alexander’s lesson applies to 
software, it implies that a development project ought to have less of a plan in place than current 
thinking allows. This provides a mechanism for motivation and a sense of responsibility to those 
developers who later must work with the code.”). 
 113. ALEXANDER, THE NATURE OF ORDER, supra note 111, at 86. See also Feenberg, supra 
note 23, at 3–4 (“The apparent origin of complex wholes lies in their parts but, paradoxical though 
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Alexander writes, “[t]he flower is not made from petals. The petals are 
made from their role and position in the flower.”114 In other words, the 
primacy or presence of the whole can be found in each of its parts. 
Similarly, in writing/reading and in speaking/listening, the significance 
of words in a sentence arises from their role and position in a 
sentence.115 Alexander characterizes this phenomenon as a recursion or 
interpenetration.116 
Wholeness has an elusive quality that reveals the limits of 
language. Alexander writes: 
Words fail to capture it because it is much more precise than any 
word. The quality itself is sharp, exact, with no looseness in it 
whatsoever. But each word you choose to capture it has fuzzy edges 
and extensions which blur the central meaning of the 
quality . . . . Imagine the quality without a name as a point, and each 
of the words which we have tried as an ellipse. Each ellipse includes 
this point. But each ellipse also covers many other meanings, which 
are distant from this point.117 
According to Alexander, “[t]he word which we most often use to talk 
about the quality without a name is the word ‘alive.’”118  
Similarly, courts have employed the rhetoric of life and vitality in 
characterizing patent claims and technological expressions.119 While 
it seems, in reality the parts find their origin in the whole to which they belong . . . . The part can 
be separated from the whole but it then loses its function. A tire that has been removed from a car 
continues to be a tire but it cannot do the things tires are meant to do . . . it is easy to see that the 
form and even the existence of tires such as we know them depends on the whole car they are 
destined to serve. . . . The car is not just assembled from pre-existing parts since the nature of the 
parts is derived from the design of the car and vice versa.”). 
 114. ALEXANDER, THE NATURE OF ORDER, supra note 111, at 87–88. 
 115. This semantic phenomenon is illustrated by a story of a British statesman, known as 
Lord Palmerston. While addressing an audience, Palmerston was interrupted with a question 
whether he will vote for a certain reform. Palmerston answered, “I will” while some audience 
cheered. He then added “not” while others hailed. Then he concluded with “tell you!” after which 
the whole audience applauded. See 33 PRAIRIE FARMER 827 (1866).  
 116. ALEXANDER, THE NATURE OF ORDER, supra note 111, at 116–118. 
 117. ALEXANDER, THE TIMELESS WAY OF BUILDINGS, supra note 103, at 39.  
 118. Id. at 29. Interestingly, in thinking about the difference between biology and (simple) 
engineered machines, John von Neumann struggled with a concept that has “no adequate name,” 
a concept that was later named “complexity.” JOHN VON NEUMANN, THEORY OF SELF-
REPRODUCING AUTOMATA 78 (Arthur W. Burks ed., 1966). Von Neumann posited a complexity 
threshold beyond which a system changes qualitatively rather than merely quantitatively. Id. at 
80. 
 119. For example, consider the jurisprudence on the interpretation of preambular language. 
See, e.g., Schram Glass Mfg. Co. v. Homer Brooke Glass Co., 249 F. 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1918) 
(“[the preamble] may so affect the enumerated elements [of a claim] as to give life and meaning 
and vitality to them, as they appear in the combination.”); Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152 
(C.C.P.A. 1951) (“[T]he preamble was considered necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to 
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such terms are arguably inexact, the terms describe an undeniable 
intuition about the nature of human expressions.120 Fundamentally, 
human expressions—whether architectural or technological—are vital 
precisely because they arise from a fertile ground of alternatives (which 
are themselves at once intellectual fruits and soil).121 Understandably, 
then, computer science professor Waguespack submits that the term 
choice serves well for the translation of Alexander's theories for 
physical space to the conceptual, cognitive space of information and 
computer systems.122 Professor Waguespack observed: 
Choices are the centers that lie at the root of life in information 
systems. Choices address different aspects of system abstraction at 
different points or stages in system development. A choice by nature 
admits to alternatives and the prospect of reconsideration when an 
unfolding context of experience and understanding merits it. 
Alexander uses this term, unfolding, repeatedly to explain the 
evolution of an architectural conception toward a useful 
intensification of life. In this sense, a living information system 
model unfolds revealing a continuity of structure and function and 
consonance with the context within which it is intended to serve.123 
“In Alexander’s terms,” Waguespack writes, “the degree to which these 
choices contribute to the whole (system) determines to what degree the 
system has life.”124  
the claims or counts.”); see also Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 
(2d Cir. 1992) (“. . . qualitatively vital aspect of the plaintiff’s protectable expression.”). 
 120. Alexander’s empirical research over 30 years yields the extraordinary fact that the 
degree of perceived life in things is an objective, measurable quality that transcends culture. 
CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM THE NATURE OF ORDER 3 (2006), 
available at http://www.livingneighborhoods.org/library/empirical-findings.pdf (“Degree of life 
is an objective quality that may be measured by reliable empirical methods. The empirical test 
that most trenchantly predicts ‘life’ in things, in comparing two things, is a test that asks which of 
the two induces the greater wholeness in the observer.”). 
 121. Based on empirical findings, Alexander concluded that the degree of life in things is 
correlated to 15 properties (e.g., “local symmetries,” “deep interlock,” “graded variation,” etc.) 
that are generative. Id. 
 122. Underscoring this critical point, Professor Allen observes that “there is never one single 
solution to an engineering problem . . . [t]hat, I think, touches the heart of the matter, which is the 
availability and necessity of choice. Engineering is pervaded by choice. There are alternative ways 
to design any component of any system, with systematic implications for the rest of the design. 
Every technological problem has alternative solutions, and the more engineering there is, the more 
alternatives to choose from. One might even say that modern engineering does not exist until there 
is a relative density of technical alternatives and an art of technological choice.” BARRY ALLEN, 
ARTIFICE AND DESIGN, ART AND TECHNOLOGY IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE 130 (2008).  
 123. WAGUESPACK, supra note 106, at 11–12. 
 124. Id. at 12. 
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Alexander’s conception of wholeness suggests an approach to 
thinking about the well-accepted principle, as articulated by Mayo, that 
the whole must exceed the sum of the parts.125 If the principle is 
formulated as a question (i.e., does the whole exceed the sum of the 
parts taken separately?), the question can be understood as a 
constitutive question. The question presupposes a naïve ontology (of 
technological parts and wholes) in order to make possible an inquiry. 
The constitutive question posits a given (i.e., the whole may exceed the 
sum of the parts), the impossibility of which the interrogator is assigned 
to investigate.126  
More fruitfully, if the principle can be understood as calling for an 
operative action, the principle calls for a kind of explicative unfolding. 
What is unfolded is the interpenetration of the whole and its constituent 
parts. What is unfolded is the internal coherence of an architecture and 
the significance of the choices that structure the architecture as a whole. 
The recursion, it follows, is a kind of hermeneutic circle in which a 
better understanding of the parts leads to a more penetrating perception 
of the whole, which, in turn, deepens understanding of the parts.127 The 
excess, it follows, has a diachronic rather than a synchronic character. 
The excess is inseparable from the deepening process of understanding 
and cannot exist apart from the inquiry. Stated differently, the principle 
does not call for a comparison of ready-made and isolatable quantities 
(i.e., the parts themselves, taken separately), or any measures derived 
therefrom (e.g., emergent features and functionality).128 The principle 
calls not for arithmetic but for explication.129 
 125. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 126. Similarly, “[t]he social scientist asks, ‘How is social order possible?’ The form of the 
question…is naïve, not skeptical . . . it suppresses the moment of skepticism in order to constitute 
an entity, called social order, capable of being investigated.” See WILLIAM RASCH, NIKLAS 
LUHMANN’S MODERNITY, THE PARADOXES OF DIFFERENTIATION 48–49 (2000) (observing that 
“the disciplinary question does more than just register the complexity it studies; it implicates itself 
in that complexity in order to allow for its own continued existence . . . . A discipline, a system, 
that could adequately and finally answer the question it poses for itself would cease to exist.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 127. See, e.g., supra note 115.  
 128. The notion of emergent functionality or property does not provide a discriminating 
criterion for the principle that the whole must exceed the sum of the parts. Emergent properties, 
especially for software, are found in every purposive combination of elements. Consider the 
following example. A byte (i.e., 8 bits) can encode 28 or 256 different values. A combination of 2 
bytes (i.e., 16 bits) can encode 216 or 65536 values. The whole (216) is more than the sum of the 
parts taken separately (28 +28). The emergent property of the whole arises not because the basic 
functions of the bytes have changed. Rather, the primacy of the whole (i.e., two-byte encoding) 
induces a significance in the parts (i.e., higher-order byte vs. lower-order byte).  
 129. But see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 
(1950) (“The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when 
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An explicative unfolding of the whole reveals the significance—
the operative term130—of particular choices. Indeed, fundamentally at 
issue in Alice and in Altai are design choices (and their significance) in 
the creative process of writing software that is revealed, as the 
following parts show, by an unfolding of the software architectures at 
issue. 
2. Architecture of Software: The Structure of Conceptual 
Space 
Part II.B.2 explicates the software architecture at issue in Altai, 
illustrating the creative process of writing software, to reveal two 
difficulties that eluded the court—what is an abstraction and why code 
is abstracted in particular ways.  
Computer Associates’ software, CA-SCHEDULER, is a job 
scheduling program designed to create a schedule specifying when the 
computer should run various tasks, and then to control the computer as 
it executes the schedule.131 CA-SCHEDULER is designed for the IBM 
System 370 family of computers, which may support one of three 
operating systems: DOS/VSE, MVS, or CMS.132  CA-SCHEDULER 
contains a first component that contains only the task-specific portions 
of the program, independent of the operating system, and a second 
component, ADAPTOR, which contains all the interconnections 
between the first component and the operating system.133 Because 
software written for one operating system will not, without 
modification, run under another operating system, the ADAPTOR 
component allows reuse of the first component by translating “system 
the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices 
patentable . . . . Neither court below has made any finding that old elements which made up this 
device perform any additional or different function in the combination than they perform out of 
it. . . . Two and two have been added together, and still they make only four.”) (emphasis added). 
However, the Court never inquired into precisely why “the resultant device words [sic] as claimed, 
speeds the customer on his way, reduces checking costs for the merchant, has been widely adopted 
and successfully used . . . .” Id. at 149. The Court never inquired into the significance of the 
constituent parts in light of the whole. Id. at 152 (“This counter does what a store counter always 
has done—it supports merchandise at a convenient height while the customer makes his purchases 
and the merchant his sales. The three-sided rack will draw or push goods put within it from one 
place to another—just what any such a rack would do on any smooth surface—and the guide rails 
keep it from falling or sliding off from the counter, as guide rails have ever done.”). 
 130. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012) 
(“. . . those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts 
taken separately.”). 
 131. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 699. 
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calls” into the language of a particular operating system.134 Altai hired 
Arney, a former employee of Computer Associates, to help rewrite its 
own job scheduling software, ZEKE, so that it could be run on the MVS 
operating system.135 Arney introduced the “common system interface” 
architecture of CA-SCHEDULER into ZEKE. Arney also used 
approximately 30% of ADAPTOR's source code to create a similar 
component, OSCAR, which allows ZEKE to interface with the MVS 
operating system.136 
The court in Altai largely agreed with and reproduced the District 
Court’s analytical approach.137 In applying the abstraction step, the 
court found that the program's overall structure comprises of the 
following levels of increasing abstraction: object code, source code, 
parameter lists, macros, lists of services, and organizational charts.138 
In applying the filtration step, the court determined that most of the 
parameter lists and macros were either in the public domain or dictated 
by the functional demands of the program.139 In applying the 
comparison step, the court held that the few remaining parameter lists 
and macros are not protectable by copyright given their relative 
contribution to the overall program.140 The court also held that the 
organizational charts are non-protectable because the charts “follow 
naturally from the work's theme rather than from the author’s 
creativity.”141 
Altai has been overwhelmingly well-received by scholars and 
jurists. For determining substantial similarity in the non-literal aspects 
of computer programs, courts have adopted the analysis of the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test.142 Altai has also been endorsed 
by courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and France.143 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 700. 
 137. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We 
note that [District Court] Judge Pratt’s method of analysis effectively served as a road map for 
our own, with one exception. . . . We think that our approach—i.e., filtering out the unprotected 
aspects of an allegedly infringed program and then comparing the end product to the structure of 
the suspect program—is preferable . . . .”). 
 138. Id. at 714. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 714–715. 
 141. Id. at 715 (quoting 3 Nimmer § 13.03 [F][3], at 13–65). 
 142. Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 
1, 15 (1995) (“In the two and one-half years since Altai was decided, the Second Circuit’s filtration 
approach has been endorsed by the Federal Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth 
Circuit, and district courts in the Eleventh Circuit.”) (citations omitted). 
 143. Id.  
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However, remaining largely obscured are two difficulties, which 
will be discussed in turn below. The first difficulty involves the 
question of what can properly be characterized as abstractions. For 
example, well-known in the art of computer software, parameter lists 
and macros are not abstractions of code. Rather, they are input that 
affect the run-time behavior of code. One can reasonably surmise that 
the parameter lists for both ADAPTOR and OSCAR include 
parameters that relate to the requirements of particular operating 
systems or particular tasks. One can also surmise that the macros define 
the run-time behavior of the interface or the executed tasks. Therefore, 
properly characterized as input, parameter lists and macros are not 
abstractions of code.144 In the Reply Brief, Plaintiff-Appellant correctly 
argued that “parameter lists and macros are not in any sense 
abstractions of code, but are entirely different aspects of a computer 
program.”145 However, holding otherwise, the Plaintiff-Appellant 
argued, the court “provides no rationale for its actions and provides no 
guidance for reasoned decision-making in the future.”146 Consequently, 
despite the widespread adoption of the Altai test, courts have applied it 
inconsistently.147  
Properly applied, the abstraction step of the Altai test should 
mirror the creative process of writing code. The abstraction step should 
“retrace and map each of the designer’s steps—in the opposite order 
in which they were taken during the program’s creation.”148 Therefore, 
the abstraction step suggests a definition of abstraction that is 
semantically manifold—abstraction is at once a noun and a verb. In 
other words, abstractions are the products of the act of abstraction.  
Abstractions are not interpretations that are derived a posteriori 
(even if those abstractions are themselves conditions for the possibility 
of further abstractions and creativity). A computer program, as a 
technical artifact, can surely be abstracted, interpreted, parsed in many, 
if not countless, possible ways. For example, a parameter list may be 
interpreted as abstracted code which is utilized for instantiating 
 144. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 697–98 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A 
parameter list, according to the expert appointed and fully credited by the district court, Dr. 
Randall Davis, is ‘the information sent to and received from a subroutine.’ See Report of Dr. 
Randall Davis, at 12. The term ‘parameter list’ refers to the form in which information is passed 
between modules (e.g. for accounts receivable, the designated time frame and particular customer 
identifying number) and the information’s actual content . . . .”). 
 145. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Computer Associates Int’l, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. Altai, Inc., Defendant-Appellee., No. 91-7893, 1991 WL 11010234 (C.A.2). 
 146. Id. at 5. 
 147. See Lemley, infra note 151–152 and accompanying text. 
 148. Altai, 982 F.2d at 707 (emphasis added). 
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variables during the execution of the computer program.149 Similarly, 
“a computer program can often be parsed into at least six levels of 
generally declining abstraction: (i) the main purpose, (ii) the program 
structure or architecture, (iii) modules, (iv) algorithms and data 
structures, (v) source code, and (vi) object code.”150 However, ad hoc 
interpretations of a computer program result in inconsistent 
applications of the Altai test, despite a superficial appearance of 
convergence, as argued by Professor Lemley.151  
Ad hoc interpretations of computer programs also diminish the 
potency of the term abstraction. While Professor Lemley is correct in 
arguing that “[c]ourts adjust the [Altai] test to fit their particular view 
of programming . . . in the computer cases everyone seems to have 
forgotten that the abstraction test is only a judicial construct.”152 
However, contrary to Professor Lemley’s argument, in the software 
context, unlike the literary context, abstraction is not an artificial 
construct.153 As the following pages show, the creative process of 
writing software can be understood as a formal process of abstraction. 
Thus, a narrower and more fruitful definition of abstraction (i.e., as the 
product of the act of abstraction in the process of creation) allows for 
an inquiry into creativity to enter directly into and clarify the eligibility 
 149. Thanks to Professor Karjala for this interesting perspective. E-mail from Professor 
Dennis S. Karjala, Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, ASU College of Law, to Scott T. Luan (Sept. 
4, 2014, 17:53 EST) (on file with author). 
 150. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(citations omitted). Such an interpretation of computer programs is problematic because inter alia 
it confuses categories of concept (e.g., algorithms, architecture) with methods of implementation 
(e.g., modules). For example, an algorithm (or data structure) may utilize functions (or data types) 
from a plurality of modules or libraries that are linked into an executable program. Admittedly, 
modules, as a term of art, is ambiguous. However, the point remains valid regardless of whether 
modules is construed to be packages, libraries, source files, subroutines, or code segments.  
 151. Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 
1, 3 (1995) (“Having finally resolved the debate that has been plaguing software copyright law 
since its inception, courts are discovering to their chagrin, that deciding what test to apply actually 
tells you very little about how to apply that test. Despite the convergence of courts on Altai’s 
filtration approach, courts remain fundamentally conflicted in deciding how broadly to protect 
software copyright.”). 
 152. Id. at 20–21 (arguing that “[a]ll of this debate [about the proper level of abstraction] 
misconstrues and unnecessarily complicates the abstraction step of the Altai test. The problem is 
that lawyers and courts take the abstraction step too literally, forgetting that it is intended to be, 
in fact, an abstraction.”). 
 153. Id. at 20 (submitting that “in the literary context we all know that this ‘higher level of 
abstraction’ is merely an artificial construct to help us decide the case. There may or may not be 
a ‘chapter outline’ and a ‘paragraph outline’ which were used in writing the copyrighted work. 
But it doesn’t really matter. Certainly, the inquiry is not whether the defendant had access to and 
copied from the outline, but whether he copied from the finished work at that particular level of 
generality.”). 
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determination.154 To understand why, we would have to consider a 
second difficulty.  
The second difficulty is not as easily clarified. The first difficulty 
relates to the question of what is an abstraction. By contrast, the second 
difficulty involves the related questions of how and why code is 
abstracted in particular ways during the process of creation. The second 
difficulty is best approached by way of examples from Alexander's A 
Pattern Language and the seminal book on software design patterns by 
“The Gang of Four.” The nature of the material requires a treatment 
that is unavoidably technical. However, I believe that the material 
allows for simplification and suggestion without risking technical 
inaccuracies.  
Note that my approach is explicatory rather than based on analysis 
of actual source code. The intent of this part is to reveal the technical 
possibilities and software design choices even though Arney, the 
engineer of the software at issue in Altai, may not have explicitly 
utilized the pattern language formulated by the “Gang of Four.” 
Similarly, Alexander’s pattern language of architectural design 
describes timeless solutions to recurring problems even though 
architects from past centuries had not relied on Alexander’s specific 
formulations. I believe this approach most clearly illustrates the process 
of creativity, a process that has eluded legal scholars and jurists. The 
basic argument is that software design choices are at once subjective 
and objective, satisfying both cognitive and machine requirements. The 
argument is supported by additional references to a classic paper in 
computer science by Stanford University professor Donald Knuth155 
and to the well-established engineering practice of “code 
refactoring.”156 
  
 154. See infra note 181.  
 155. See infra notes 169–177 and accompanying text. 
 156. See infra note 178. 
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Figure 1: Adapter Pattern (based on GoF, 139) 
The Adapter pattern, as depicted in Fig. 1, describes the high-level 
structure of the ADAPTOR component. The pattern interfaces the 
Client with the Adaptee. For Computer Associates’ software, the 
SCHEDULER corresponds to the Client and the host operating system 
(OS) corresponds to the Adaptee. Utilizing a generalized system-call 
interface, the Adaptor translates the request by the Client into an OS-
specific system call. Thus, the Adapter pattern provides a system-
agnostic interface such that SCHEDULER can invoke an unchanging 
set of system calls regardless of the particular host operating system. 
Accordingly, SCHEDULER may be reused in different operating 
systems without changes to the source code. 
The Adapter pattern structures conceptual space just as 
Alexander’s Arcade pattern structures physical space. Reflecting on the 
archetypal, deeply-rooted nature of certain timeless patterns, 
Alexander noted that “[w]e doubt very much whether anyone could 
construct a valid pattern language, in his own mind, which did not 
include the pattern ARCADES . . . for example, or the pattern 
ALCOVES . . . .”157 According to Alexander, one recurring problem in 
architecture is the possibility that “there are no strong connections 
between the territorial world within the building and the purely public 
world outside. There are no realms between the two kinds of spaces 
which are ambiguously a part of each—places that are both 
characteristic of the territory inside, and simultaneously, part of the 
public world.”158 Consequently, buildings are often much more 
unfriendly than they need to be.159 The arcade, according to Alexander, 
is the most simple and beautiful way of structuring physical space such 
that the space contains the character of a building’s interior while 
simultaneously being open to the public world. Similarly, the Adapter 
 157. ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN OF LANGUAGE, supra note 105, at xvii.  
 158. Id. at 581. 
 159. Id. 
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pattern structures cognitive, conceptual space such that two digital 
realms160 are connected by an interface that is a part of each.    
The system calls invoked by the Client may comprise complex 
commands with various parameters. A simple, hypothetical example is 
illustrative. A command that saves data to file requires the actual data, 
the file name, and the directory path to the file. Other parameters may 
relate to formatting, encryption, and scheduling requirements. These 
parameters may be included as input in parameter lists, as in the 
SCHEDULER software. During execution of the program when 
various commands are invoked, these parameters are passed to the 
appropriate components. 
Figure 2. Command Pattern (based on GoF, 233) 
The Command pattern, as depicted in Fig. 2, allows the 
programmer to encapsulate all the information needed to execute a 
particular command. For Computer Associates’ software, the Invoker 
corresponds to the ADAPTOR and the Receiver corresponds to the 
SCHEDULER. The Receiver creates a Concrete_Command or 
“command object” as an instantiation of the Abstracted_Command. 
The Concrete_Command encapsulates all the particularities of the 
specific command and provides the Invoker with a simple mechanism, 
abstracted_execute(), that is common to all “command objects.” The 
Invoker (i.e., ADAPTOR) simply executes the abstracted_execute() 
function from a high-level perspective (i.e., without knowledge of the 
underlying implementation of Concrete_Command) after deciding 
which commands to execute based on their scheduling requirements as 
determined by Receiver (i.e., SCHEDULER). 
The Command pattern structures conceptual space just as 
Alexander's Alcove pattern structures physical space. Alexander 
observed that the intimate physical space shared by a family is critical. 
 160. Computer Associates’ ADAPTOR can be understood as an interface between “kernel 
space” and “user space.” 
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The emotional qualities of a healthy family life “will only come into 
existence if the members of the house are physically able to be together 
as a family.”161 Shared spaces that do not allow for members of the 
family to be together, even when they are doing different things, 
inevitably encourages the habit of doing things apart. According to 
Alexander, the alcove is a fundamental pattern that reconciles the 
“opposing needs for some seclusion and some community at the same 
time in the same space.”162 Alcoves are small spaces at the periphery 
of larger family room such that “any clutter that develops in them does 
not encroach on the communal uses of the main room.”163 Thus, alcoves 
structure physical space in a way that reconciles private and shared 
aspects of family life. Similarly, the Command pattern structures 
conceptual space in a way that reconciles different aspects of software 
design. Just as alcoves seclude “clutter,” so the Command pattern 
encapsulates and “hides” the disparate information required to execute 
a particular command.   
In computer science, scheduling disciplines or strategies are 
algorithms that allocate shared resources to multiple processes.164 The 
shared resource may be memory access or cycles of the 
microprocessor. If multiple processes or commands need to be 
executed, the scheduling strategy algorithm allocates cycles of the 
microprocessor so that each command is executed in a timely manner. 
  
 161. ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE, supra note 105, at 829. 
 162. Id. at 831. 
 163. Id. at 830. 
 164. Scheduling may be implemented in a variety of ways. For example, the First-Come, 
First-Served (FCFS) strategy simply adds commands to a list or queue. The commands are 
executed in the order that they are added to the queue. The Shortest-Job-First (SJF) strategy 
estimates the remaining execution time for each command and rearranges the command queue 
such that the command closest to being completed is scheduled for immediate execution. The 
fixed priority pre-emptive scheduling strategy assigns a fixed priority to each command and 
rearranges the command queue in order of increasing priority. The command with the highest 
priority is immediately executed. By contrast, the round-robin scheduling strategy assigns a fixed 
time unit for each command and cycles through them. 
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Figure 3.  Strategy Pattern (based on GoF, 315) 
The Strategy pattern, depicted in Fig. 3, is a design pattern which 
allows an algorithm’s behavior to be modified during runtime. For 
example, the scheduling algorithm can be modified during runtime in 
order to select a particular Concrete_Strategy based on Context. Such 
a selection of strategy may be understood as a “macro” or “macro-
instruction” which operates on or invokes large blocks of code 
corresponding to a particular strategy. Similarly, the “macros” at issue 
in Altai relate to runtime configuration of software behavior.  
For Computer Associates’ software, the Strategy pattern may be 
an abstraction that is implemented in the SCHEDULER component. 
Such an architecture is conceptually compelling because the 
responsibility of scheduling can be completely allocated to the 
SCHEDULER. The ADAPTOR component simply translates the 
scheduled commands to the particular system calls of the host operating 
system. Therefore, in this architecture, the Strategy pattern occupies a 
higher level of abstraction than the Command pattern in the sense that 
the Context or choice of strategy is independent of the particularities of 
various commands. Thus, such a structuring of conceptual space is 
consistent with the court's finding in Altai that macros are a “higher 
level of abstraction” than parameter lists.  
Alternatively, the Strategy pattern may be an abstraction that is 
implemented in the ADAPTOR component. Such an architecture has 
the advantage that scheduling strategies are more attuned to the 
characteristics of particular host operating systems.165 In Linux, 
 165. This statement is not unconditionally true. For example, consider a controversy that has 
far-reaching implications with respect to the “UNIX philosophy” of implementing “mechanism, 
not policy,” as originated by Ken Thompson. See The Unix Philosophy: A Brief Introduction, 
LINUX INFORMATION PROJECT (Aug. 6, 2006), http://www.linfo.org/unix_philosophy.html. 
Thompson, in collaboration with Dennis Ritchie, designed and implemented the original Unix 
operating system at Bell Labs in 1969. The controversy was centered on a “patch” (i.e., an 
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Microsoft Windows, and other operating systems, the code that 
schedules processes is found in “kernel space” within the operating 
system itself (rather than “user space,” in which applications such as 
SCHEDULER are executed).166 If the scheduling and execution of 
commands involve time-critical requirements, then the Strategy pattern 
may be implemented in “kernel space” of ADAPTOR. In this 
architecture, command parameters may include the particularities of 
the scheduling strategy. Therefore, given this dependency, the 
Command pattern and its corresponding parameter lists may be 
understood as occupying a higher level of abstraction than the Strategy 
pattern and its corresponding notion of “macros.” This design choice 
yields a result that is contrary to the findings of the court in Altai.  
The foregoing hypothetical design choices are divergent, resulting 
in contrary determinations about the levels of abstraction and revealing 
a deficiency in the court's analysis in Altai. The court did not inquire 
more carefully into the architecture underlying the external aspects of 
the software. The “macros” and “parameter lists” are not abstractions 
per se. Rather, they are externalizations of a hidden interior, a 
conceptual space that allows for different possible software 
architectures that would, in turn, yield contrary determinations by a 
court. Without a careful inquiry of the creative process, without a 
careful scrutiny of possible design choices and the resulting 
abstractions, the court in Altai arrived at the conclusory finding that no 
upgrade) for the Linux kernel that implemented a scheduling algorithm known as the “Completely 
Fair Scheduler” (CFS). Based on ideas suggested by Linus Torvalds, the chief architect of the 
Linux kernel, the CFS was expected to significantly boost multi-tasking performance. However, 
not everyone was convinced about the value of the kernel patch. In response to a challenge by 
Torvalds—”Numbers talk, bullshit walks”—Lennart Poettering of Red Hat, a company providing 
open-source software products, developed an equivalent user-space implementation of CFS. See 
Re: [RFC/RFT PATCH v3] Sched: Automated Per Tty Task Groups, MARC (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=128993691017646&w=2. Poettering responded: “Here’s 
my super-complex patch btw, to achieve exactly the same thing from userspace without involving 
any kernel or systemd patching and kernel-side logic.” Id. The discussion thread reveals that 
design choices in the development of software are far from being determinable with 
“mathematical precision.” But see Marci A. Hamilton & Ted Sabety, Computer Science Concepts 
in Copyright Cases: The Path of a Coherent Law, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 239, 279–80 (1996–
1997) (arguing that the answer to the question of implementation can be determined with 
“mathematical precision.”). According to Poettering, “there are a lot of userspace folsk [sic] being 
afraid of and too lazy to hacking the kernel and hence rather workaround kernel fuckups in 
userspace then fixing it properly. But you [Torvalds] are doing it the other way round, since 
userspace gives you the creeps . . . .” See Re: [RFC/RFT PATCH v3] Sched: Automated Per Tty 
Task Groups, MARC (Nov. 16, 2010), http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=1289936910176 
46&w=2. 
 166. Thus, ADPATOR may be understood as a translation or interface between “user space” 
and “kernel space.” 
 
13_ARTICLE_LUAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2015  11:27 PM 
350 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
weight should be accorded to the program's organization because it is 
“so simple and obvious.”167   
The foregoing hypothetical design choices reveal an elusive 
aspect of software. The material and abstractions that are used to build 
software are of a character such that their functions serve pivotal roles 
in the process of creation. Just as the architecture of buildings organizes 
physical space, the architecture of software structures conceptual space 
with similar notions of encapsulation, modularity, translation, and 
interface. The design choices in the architecture of a building balance 
the goal of achieving economy of materials and space with the goal of 
achieving certain affects among the inhabitants of the building. A 
poetics of architecture, according to Alexander, appreciates fine 
balances that achieve both goals within a confined space. Similarly, the 
design choices in software architecture balance the external 
requirements of machine performance with the requirements of—for 
lack of a better term—cognitive efficiency.168 
This critical point can also be made by reference to a classic paper 
in computer science by Stanford University professor Donald Knuth.169 
In his attempt to resolve the controversy surrounding “go-to” 
statements at the dawn of “structured programming,”170 Knuth clarifies 
the role of abstractions in the creative process of writing software code. 
Knuth poses the question: “when do they [go-to statements] correspond 
to a good abstraction?”171 Knuth argues that “the presence or absence 
of go to statements is not really the issue. The underlying structure of 
the program is what counts, and we want only to avoid usages which 
somehow clutter up the program.”172 Thus, according to Knuth, the real 
 167. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 168. Professor Allen makes the same point in the context of architectural design of the 
Holland Tunnel. Allen observes that “[o]ne reason the Holland Tunnel ventilation system works 
so well nearly a century after it was built is that it was designed with maintenance in mind, 
designed to be accessible, to be moved through and manipulated by a human body in a way that 
is coherent with our most efficient cognitive preferences.” ALLEN, supra note 122, at 147. 
 169. See Donald E. Knuth, Structured Programming with go to Statements, 6 COMPUTING 
SURVEYS 261 (1974). 
 170. “Structured programming” is an approach to programming that aims to improve the 
readability and quality of computer programs by utilizing various control structures such as if-
then conditional statements, iteration loops, and subroutines. See generally O.J. DAHL, E. W. 
DIJKSTRA & C. A. R. HOARE, STRUCTURED PROGRAMMING (1972). Knuth observes that, unlike 
go-to statements, “sequential composition, iteration, and conditional statements present syntactic 
structures that the eye can readily assimilate.” Knuth, Structured Programing, supra note 169, at 
292.  
 171. Knuth, Structured Programing, supra note 169, at 294.  
 172. Id. at 275. 
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issue is the “subjective question of program structure.”173 Knuth warns 
that “premature emphasis on efficiency [during software development] 
is a big mistake which may well be the source of most programming 
complexity and grief.”174 Rather, Knuth argues, “we should strive most 
of all for a program that is easy to understand.”175 Quoting Sir Charles 
Antony Richard Hoare, a renowned British computer scientist, Knuth 
defined structured programming as “the systematic use of abstraction 
to control a mass of detail, and also a means of documentation which 
aids program design.”176 According to Knuth, “for each particular 
problem there seems to be an appropriate level [of abstraction].”177  
In the comparisons between architectural patterns for software and 
for buildings, for conceptual and for physical space, we have seen that 
abstractions are the results of design choices that address both machine 
and cognitive requirements.178 The functional purpose of software is 
not just to achieve an optimality under the constraints of an operative 
environment, but also to achieve an affect/effect that can be 
characterized as cognitive—a kind of cognitive efficiency.179 The 
 173. Id. at 291 (emphasis added); see also Donald E. Knuth, Literate Programming, 27 IEEE 
COMPUTER JOURNAL 97, 97 (1984) (“Let us change our traditional attitude to the construction of 
programs: Instead of imagining that our main task is to instruct a computer what to do, let us 
concentrate rather on explaining to human beings what we want a computer to do. The practitioner 
of literate programming can be regarded as an essayist, whose main concern is with exposition 
and excellence of style.”). This point is underscored by another classic text in computer science 
which had originally served as an introductory textbook at MIT. See ABELSON ET AL., supra note 
27, at xxii (“Our design of this introductory computer-science subject reflects two major concerns. 
First, we want to establish the idea that a computer language is not just a way of getting a computer 
to perform operations but rather that it is a novel formal medium for expressing ideas about 
methodology. Thus, programs must be written for people to read, and only incidentally for 
machines to execute.”) (emphasis added). 
 174. Knuth, Structured Programing, supra note 169, at 294.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 292.  
 177. Id. at 294.  
 178. The point can also be made by reference to the well-established software development 
practice of “code refactoring.” Introduced in the early 1990s, the practice of code refactoring aims 
to improve the nonfunctional attributes of software such as code readability and maintainability 
and to create a more expressive internal architecture that easily allows for future extensions or 
refinements (i.e., extensibility). See generally JOSHUA KERIEVSKY, REFACTORING TO PATTERNS 
(2004). According to Fowler’s canonical text, refactoring is the “process of changing a software 
system in such a way that it does not alter the external behaviour of the code yet improves its 
internal structure.” See MARTIN FOWLER, REFACTORING: IMPROVING THE DESIGN OF EXISTING 
PROGRAMS xxi (14th prtg. 2004). “Some refactorings remove code redundancy, some raise the 
level of abstraction, some enhance the reusability, and so on.” See Tom Mens & Tom Tourwé, A 
Survey of Software Refactoring, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 126, 130 
(Feb. 2004).  
 179. Utilitarian definitions of technology based on the seemingly objective criteria of 
efficiency are rendered problematic by the more elusive notion of cognitive efficiency. See infra 
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functional purpose of a computer program is not just to perform in an 
external environment, but also to structure, during the formation of the 
program, the conceptual space within the imagination of the 
programmer. Within the completed form of a computer program are 
artifacts of its creation.  This is a critical point. Stated differently, as 
more than a set of instructions, code encodes a conceptual space. 
The foregoing hypothetical design choices illustrate a possible 
difficulty encountered by courts during fact-finding. Ideally, code 
should be, what the art understands as, “self-documenting”—that is, a 
reader of code should be able to understand the underlying reasoning 
and choices by reading the code itself without any annotation or 
commentary. The development and evolution of high-level 
programming languages have afforded code a “readability” that 
approximates that of natural languages. With some patience and 
imagination, such code may likely yield its original intent, as it were. 
By contrast, older code that remains operative, despite the long absence 
of its authors, may likely be inscrutable.180 Even though we know the 
external effects of such code, as externalized in parameter lists and 
macros, for example, we cannot access the reasoning and abstractions 
that structure those effects, a structuring that is determinative of how 
the various levels of abstraction are ordered and represented. Thus, 
contrary to Professor Karjala, an inquiry into creativity would clarify 
(rather than muddle) the determination of subject-matter eligibility.181 
In the final analysis, without understanding the creative process of 
writing software, courts cannot properly and objectively apply the 
abstraction step of the Altai test. Similarly, without a careful inquiry 
into the creative process, as the following parts argue, courts cannot 
note 291.  
 180. See, e.g., JASON SMITH, ELEMENT DESIGN PATTERNS 5 (2012) (“[S]oftware has a 
peculiar trait of living long past its expected lifetime. COBOL is still a force to be reckoned with 
in business systems around the globe. Fortran still performs much of the computation in the 
world’s scientific modeling software. Currently shipping major high-performance computer 
systems have code embedded deep in their firmware that was first created three decades or more 
ago, in assembler or C. You can be almost certain that somewhere in the millions of lines of 
implementation that came with your latest personal computer acquisition lies a piece of source 
code that no person currently understands.”). 
 181. See Feenberg, supra note 23, at 7 (“No device emerged full blown from the logic of its 
functioning. Every process of development is fraught with contingencies, choices, alternative 
possibilities. The perfecting of the technical object obliterates the traces of the labor of its 
construction. . . . It is this process that adjusts the object to its niche and so the occlusion of its 
history contributes to the forgetfulness of the whole to which it belongs. I call this the paradox of 
the origin: behind everything rational there lies a forgotten history.”). But see Dennis S. Karjala, 
Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 173 (2008) (“[C]reativity itself is not 
analytically useful in making the most basic determination of whether the creativity under 
consideration falls within copyright subject matter, patent subject matter, or neither.”).  
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properly determine the scope of claims directed to software-
implemented inventions. 
III. SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY IN PATENT LAW 
First, this part will revisit the questions posed by Mayo, as 
discussed in Part I. This part argues that Altai serves to better 
harmonize Flook and Diehr. Second, this part argues that the article’s 
harmonization of Flook and Diehr represents a special case of a more 
generalized structure of the eligibility inquiry in patent law. Informed 
by a generalized conception of the eligibility inquiry, the Part IV 
critiques Alice.  
A. Mayo Revisited 
As discussed in Part I, Mayo’s harmonization of Flook and Diehr 
is part of a developing jurisprudence that has sought to clarify the 
difference between the patentability and eligibility inquiries. Mayo’s 
harmonization poses open questions. For example, open questions 
remain about whether the larger objective of the eligibility inquiry as a 
relative functional concern can be based on predictable guiding 
principles, how the methodological tension between the “as-a-whole” 
analysis and analytical dissection can be resolved, and how the notion 
of the level of generality or abstractness should figure in the eligibility 
inquiry. 
Alice does not clarify Mayo. Alice described the second step in 
Mayo’s framework as “a search for an ‘inventive concept.’”182 Alice 
defines “an inventive concept” as “an element or combination of 
elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts 
to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] 
itself.”183 According to Alice, the “inventive concept” integrates an 
abstract idea—the “building block of human ingenuity”—into 
“something more.”184 Yet, the critical notions of “abstract idea” and 
“something more” remain undefined. Further, “the search for the 
inventive concept” lacks guiding principles. Alice merely opined that 
the elements of a claim should be considered individually and as an 
ordered combination.185 Methodologically, it is unclear how the two 
considerations should inform each other.  
 182. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id. at 7. 
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Patent law can learn from copyright law. Jurisprudence on the 
analysis of software in copyright law is more receptive to the creative 
process of writing software, that is, to software as writing.186 The 
critique of Altai in Part II shows that the creative process involves 
design choices at various levels of abstraction. By considering design 
choices, the individual elements are meaningfully integrated as an 
ordered whole at the appropriate levels of abstraction. Thus, the initial 
determination of the appropriate level of abstraction is pivotal. As 
discussed below, this initial determination is the starting point for the 
harmonization of Flook and Diehr and for the critique of Alice. 
At the appropriate levels of abstraction, Flook and Diehr can be 
harmonized. The harmonization proceeds by two analytical steps. First, 
even though the claims at issue in Flook and Diehr recite steps that 
simply apply the underlying formulas, the claims should be construed 
at different levels of abstraction. In Flook, the recited steps need not 
operate on variables in a catalytic conversion process.187 As a signal-
processing algorithm, the “smoothing” formula in Flook can be applied 
to other phenomena (e.g., even to a rubber-molding process in Diehr) 
and to other contexts. By contrast, the underlying formula in Diehr is 
less abstract. In Diehr, the underlying formula is a special empirical 
case of the Arrhenius equation.188 The recited steps, by definition, 
operate on specific variables in a rubber-molding process. As a control 
algorithm, the formula in Diehr can only be applied to the thermal-
diffusion phenomenon of rubber-curing and to the function of 
determining cure time. Therefore, because the underlying formula in 
Flook is more abstract than the formula in Diehr, the claim at issue in 
Flook should be construed at a higher level of abstraction.   
Second, at the appropriate level of abstraction, the recited steps 
are considered in light of the claim as a whole. In Flook, because the 
underlying formula at issue is applicable to other phenomena and 
contexts (i.e., other than catalytic conversion), the steps are tangential 
to the claim as a whole. Just as steps directed to surveying techniques 
are tangential to a claim applying the Pythagorean Theorem, so steps 
directed to updating alarm limits for a catalytic conversion process is 
tangential to a claim applying the “smoothing” formula in Flook. Thus, 
 186. This article suggests that understanding of software-as-writing is essential for the 
understanding of software-as-machine. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. 
Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2320 (1994); see also infra note 330 (“[S]oftware [is] a machine whose 
medium of construction happens to be text.”). 
 187. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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Flook stands for the proposition that a claim reciting steps that are 
tangential to the claim as a whole is ineligible for patent protection.189 
Claims reciting tangential steps are likely mere efforts in 
draftsmanship. As such, by definition, these claims are attempts to 
monopolize the underlying principle and should be ineligible subject-
matter.   
By contrast, in Diehr, because the recited steps are dictated by the 
terms of the underlying formula which is only applicable to 
determining cure time in a rubber-molding process, the steps are 
necessarily incidental to the claim as a whole. Thus, Diehr stands for 
the proposition that a claim reciting steps that are necessarily incidental 
to the claim as a whole may be eligible for patent protection. Claims 
reciting incidental steps may be eligible for patent protection if the 
claims satisfy normative requirements. Diehr suggests that the risks of 
overcuring or undercuring are problems the solutions for which should 
be promoted by patent law.190 That Diehr did not provide much 
elaboration does not take away from the normative character of its 
reasoning. The solution to the problem of overcuring or undercuring 
rubber can easily be justified on utilitarian grounds in terms of 
industrial efficiency.191 Utilitarianism remains the hidden principle in 
 189. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“A competent draftsman could attach some 
form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem 
would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a 
final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying 
techniques.”). As discussed below, the Court also analogized the claim at issue to “a claim that 
the formula 2[π]r can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a wheel.” Id. at 
595. Thus, the Court’s holding—”if a claim is directed essentially to a method of calculating, 
using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method 
is nonstatutory”—should be limited to (more abstract) formulas the terms of which do not dictate 
particular applications. Id. 
 190. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“[I]f the computer use incorporated in 
the process patent significantly lessens the possibility of ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring,’ the 
process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject matter.”). However, that is not 
to say that innovative technologies that prevent failures in catalytic converters should not be 
promoted by patent law.  
 191. Id. at 188 (“[W]hen a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a 
more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the threshold 
by § 101.”). Arguably, patent law can also be underwritten by normative principles that serve 
broader social goods. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“The subject-
matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and 
statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for 
the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, 
and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”); Brett 
Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 123, 126–128 
(2011) (arguing that Progress should not be measured by a utilitarian calculus that is inherently 
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Diehr.192  
B. The General Structure of the Patentable Subject-Matter 
Eligibility Inquiry 
Flook and Diehr represent the outer boundaries of the eligibility 
inquiry. Between Flook and Diehr spans a spectrum of technical 
necessity. Between the unnecessary tangential limitations in Flook and 
the necessarily incidental limitations in Diehr are those limitations that 
are directed to meaningful design choices. Choices admit of 
alternatives. By definition, choices are not strictly dictated by 
necessity. Yet, design choices are meaningful insofar as their 
significance is necessarily compelling. Meaningful design choices can 
utilize conventional patterns of proven solutions. Thus, the spectrum of 
technical necessity is a continuum spanning limitations that are 
necessarily incidental (analogous to the merger of idea and expression), 
conventional (analogous to scènes à faire), unconventional, and 
tangential. These characterizations are not discrete points in the 
spectrum of technical necessity but rather are matters of degree.  
The foregoing harmonization of Flook and Diehr suggests a 
working hypothesis of a general structure of the eligibility inquiry. The 
structure largely coincides with Mayo’s framework and is sensitive to 
the caveats in Benson and Bilski against approaches that are too rigid 
or too fine.193 Three aspects of the general structure will be discussed 
in turn below. 
First, the eligibility inquiry proceeds along two analytical steps. 
The first step in the eligibility inquiry determines the appropriate level 
of abstraction. This corresponds to the abstraction step in the Altai test. 
The second step considers, at the appropriate level of abstraction, the 
constituent elements of a claim in light of the claim as a whole. This 
corresponds to the filtration step of the Altai test. The “search for the 
short-sighted, but rather Progress should be informed by the notion of inter-generational justice 
to address the long-term well-being of the species). 
 192. See Feenberg, supra note 23, at 12 (submitting an “eighth paradox, which I will call 
the paradox of value and fact: values are the facts of the future. Values are not the opposite of 
facts, subjective desires with no basis in reality. Values express aspects of reality that have not 
yet been incorporated into the taken for granted technical environment. That environment was 
shaped by the values that presided over its creation. Technologies are the crystallized expression 
of those values.”). 
 193. Eligibility rules risk “freez[ing] process patents to old technologies, leaving no room 
for the revelations of the new, onrushing technology.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 
(1972). “[C]ourts may pose questions of such intricacy and refinement that they risk obscuring 
the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public 
domain.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606. 
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inventive concept” can be understood as a filtration.194 Just as the 
“golden nugget”195 describes an aspect of software that is eligible for 
copyright protection, the “inventive concept” describes an aspect of an 
invention that transforms the claim into subject-matter eligible for 
patent protection. 
Second, the eligibility inquiry has technical and normative 
aspects.196 The two aspects inhere in the second step of the eligibility 
inquiry. As a technical matter, the second step determines the degree 
of necessity of the recited limitations that apply the underlying 
principle. As a normative matter, the second step determines whether 
the claimed invention is the kind of function or technology that should 
be promoted by patent law. According to Diehr, the eligibility inquiry 
involves a determination whether a claim “when considered as a whole, 
is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to 
 194. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).  
 195. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Once 
a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed program which are ‘ideas’ or are 
dictated by efficiency or external factors, or taken from the public domain, there may remain a 
core of protectable expression. In terms of a work’s copyright value, this is the golden nugget.”). 
While the comparison between a “golden nugget” and an “inventive concept” highlights the 
analytical similarities between copyright and patent law, the comparison is not flawless since, 
with only a few exceptions, copyright has always eschewed protection of functional works. See, 
e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory For The Copyright Protection Of Computer Software 
And Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 80–81 (1998) (arguing that “few 
nonliteral elements of value can survive the filtering process follows directly from an honest 
reading of Computer Associates . after nonliteral elements related to efficiency, compatibility, and 
functionality have been filtered out, it is difficult to see how anything remaining could even be 
important . . . .”).  
 196. These two aspects are more clearly revealed or distinguishable in patent law than in 
copyright law perhaps because patent law confronts more directly or problematically the dual 
nature of software as writing and as machine. See infra note 329; See also Pamela Samuelson, 
Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer-
Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L. J. 1025, 1128–30 (1990) (observing that “[w]ith von Neumann’s 
discovery, machines could become writings, and writings could become machines. It is no 
wonder, then, that the existing intellectual property law systems have found it so difficult to 
respond to the phenomenon of computer programs. Programs are, in truth, too much of a 
mechanical process to fit comfortably in the copyright system and too much of a writing to fit 
comfortably in the patent system. They are a hybrid—both writing and machine at the same 
time—in a legal system that has generally assumed that an intellectual product is either a writing 
(and hence copyrightable) or a machine (and hence patentable), but not both at the same 
time. . . . Patent law, which has traditionally regarded writings and the intellection they embody 
as outside its domain, has slowly, and with mixed results, moved toward protecting the valuable 
abstractions embodied in programs. However, just as judges in copyright cases have found it 
difficult to perceive and respond to the functionality of programs, judges in patent cases have 
ignored the written and symbolic character of software. Neither copyright nor patent law has been 
able to come to terms with the essential nature of computer programs, and that is why the law in 
this area is so confusing.”). 
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protect.”197 Stated differently, determining whether an invention is the 
kind of function or technology that should be promoted by patent law 
requires ascertaining first what the purported invention is. (And 
ascertaining what the purported invention is requires a determination 
of the appropriate level of abstraction.) 
Third and lastly, in patent law, the technical and normative aspects 
of the eligibility inquiry are related according to the following lines of 
analysis. First, as discussed above, claimed limitations that are 
technically tangential to the underlying principle compel, by definition, 
a normative determination of ineligibility. Flook exemplifies this first 
line of analysis. Second, claims reciting limitations that are necessarily 
and technically incidental to the underlying principle may or may not 
be eligible, as a normative matter. The patent-eligible claim in Diehr 
and the patent-ineligible claim in Mayo exemplify contrary normative 
determinations in this second line of analysis.198 The normative 
determination, as a relative functional concern, weighs the contribution 
and creative value of the claimed invention against the risks of pre-
emption.199 The former outweighs the latter in the Diehr200 while the 
latter outweighs the former in Mayo.201 However, in this second line of 
analysis, for both Diehr and Mayo, the normative (rather than the 
technical) question is dispositive. Third, claims reciting limitations that 
are technically meaningful design choices strongly support the case for 
eligibility. In this third line of analysis, the technical (rather than the 
normative) question is likely dispositive.  
 197. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 198. As a technical matter, Mayo held that the additional steps are necessarily incidental to 
implementing the underlying principle. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012).  
 199. Id. at 1303. 
 200. Although not explicit, this normative calculus is suggested by the reasoning in Diehr. 
See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he industry has not been able to obtain uniformly accurate 
cures because the temperature of the molding press could not be precisely measured, thus making 
it difficult to do the necessary computations to determine cure time. Because the temperature 
inside the press has heretofore been viewed as an uncontrollable variable, the conventional 
industry practice has been to calculate the cure time as the shortest time in which all parts of the 
product will definitely be cured, assuming a reasonable amount of mold-opening time during 
loading and unloading. But the shortcoming of this practice is that operating with an 
uncontrollable variable inevitably led in some instances to overestimating the mold-opening time 
and overcuring the rubber, and in other instances to underestimating that time and undercuring 
the product.”). 
 201. Mayo reasoned that the claims “threaten to inhibit the development of more refined 
treatment recommendations (like that embodied in Mayo’s test), that combine Prometheus’ 
correlations with later discovered features of metabolites, human physiology or individual patient 
characteristics…including later discovered processes that measure metabolite levels in new 
ways . . . these patents tie up too much future use of laws of nature . . . .” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302. 
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This article argues that Alice should have been decided according 
to the third line of analysis, as discussed above. This article advances 
technical arguments that the recited limitations should be understood, 
at the appropriate level of abstraction, as a meaningful technological 
solution. Given the normative requirements for eligibility (e.g., 
improvement in technology or technical field), as articulated by Alice, 
the claims at issue should be eligible. This article critiques Alice as 
incorrectly unfolding along the first line of analysis—the normative 
determination is a forgone conclusion based on mischaracterizations of 
the recited limitations as a technical matter. These two lines of analysis 
diverge at the critical first step of Mayo’s framework, a step which is 
clarified below as the determination of the appropriate level of 
abstraction for claim construction. 
IV. CRITIQUE OF ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK INTL.  
A. Mayo’s Framework, Step 1: Level of Abstraction 
Alice observed that “[a]t some level [of abstraction], ‘all 
inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’”202 Therefore, Alice cautioned 
that “we [must] tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle 
[excluding abstract ideas] lest it swallow all of patent law.”203 
However, Alice’s syllogism was neither careful nor correct. Alice’s 
logical fallacy can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Construed at a high level of abstraction, the claims at issue in 
Bilski are directed to the basic concept of hedging.204 
(2) The concept of hedging is a fundamental economic practice.205 
(3) The underlying concept of intermediated settlement in the 
claims at issue in Alice is also a fundamental economic 
practice.206 
 202. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (citation omitted).  
 203. Id. 
 204. “[T]he patent at issue in Bilski claimed an ‘abstract idea’…the claims described ‘the 
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.’” Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
 205. “The Court explained that ‘[h]edging is a fundamental economic practice long 
prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class.’” Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 206. “Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is ‘a 
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” Id. at 9 (citations 
omitted). 
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(4) Therefore, the claims at issue in Alice should be construed at a 
high level of abstraction.207 
Alice erred in assuming that because, at some level, the claims at 
issue in Bilski and Alice reflect fundamental economic practices, the 
claims should be construed at the same level of abstraction.208  
Contrast the Supreme Court’s analysis with that of the Federal 
Circuit. The majority in the Federal Circuit conceded the undeniable 
conclusion that the system claims in Alice should be construed at a 
lower (albeit “incrementally reduced”) level of abstraction than the 
method claims.209 Similarly, the concurrence-in-part and dissent-in-
part (Rader, Linn, Moore, O’Malley) (hereinafter “Dissent”) in the 
Federal Circuit construed the system claims at a lower level of 
abstraction.210 The Dissent reasoned that “[t]he key to this inquiry is 
whether the claims tie the otherwise abstract idea to a specific way of 
doing something with a computer, or a specific computer for doing 
something; if so, they likely will be patent eligible . . .”211 The 
invention, the dissent observed, is a specific way of doing something 
with a computer: the computers are specifically (and architecturally) 
configured for distributed multiprocessing.212 Therefore, because the 
 207. “Thus, intermediated settlement, like hedging, is an ‘abstract idea’ beyond the scope of 
§ 101 . . . we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this 
case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk 
hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here.” Id. at 9–10. 
 208. The flawed reasoning in Alice is similar to the reasoning in Bilski. In his concurrence 
in Bilski, Justice Stevens was precisely on point in his criticism that the Court “discounts the 
application’s discussion of what sorts of data to use, and how to analyze those data, as mere ‘token 
postsolution components’. . . [and] artificially limits petitioners’ claims to hedging, and then 
concludes that hedging is an abstract idea rather than a term that describes a category of processes 
including petitioners’ claims. Why the Court does this is never made clear.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593, 620 (emphasis added). Mayo cautioned against a similar problem. See Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012) (“. . . studiously 
ignoring all laws of nature when evaluating a patent application under §§ 102 and 103 would 
make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles 
of nature which, once known, make their implementation obvious.”) (citation omitted). 
 209. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (U.S. 2013). 
 210. Id. at 1310 (“. . . these limitations are not stated at a high level of generality.”). Note 
that Chief Judge Rader and Judge Moore affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the method 
and media claims are patent ineligible. Id. at 1313. 
 211. Id. at 1302. 
 212. Id. at 1307 (“[the specification] states, for example, that the ‘core of the system 
hardware is a collection of data processing units.’ ′375 Patent col. 7 ll. 22–23. Each processing 
unit ‘is operably connected with . . . one or more mass data storage units . . . to store all data 
received from stakeholders, and other data relating to all other software operations generating or 
retrieving stored information.’ Id. col. 7 ll. 39–43. The specification also explains that the 
communications controllers ‘effect communications between the processing units . . . and the 
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recited limitations cover “the use of a computer and other hardware 
specifically programmed to solve a complex problem”213 and the steps 
are not inherent to the abstract idea of an escrow,214 the system claims 
should be construed at a lower level of abstraction. Otherwise, the 
dissent observed, “[l]abeling this system claim an ‘abstract concept’ 
wrenches all meaning from those words.”215 
In Alice, the determination of the appropriate level of abstraction 
for claim construction is pivotal. To appreciate why this is so, consider 
first the system claims at issue in Alice. 
As a technical matter, the Court’s characterization of the system 
claims is erroneous. It is simply not true that “[n]early every computer” 
will have the specific hardware of the claimed invention.216 The system 
claims recite hardware that is far from generic. The system claims are 
directed to distributed multiprocessing architectures comprising of 
multiple interconnected computers. For example, the system claims in 
US 5,970,479 and US 7,725,375 recite a decentralized architecture.217 
The system claims in US 7,725,375 recite a centralized architecture for 
which communication is coordinated by a specialized controller.218 
Solving the particular technological problem of providing sufficient 
computational capability, the distributed multiprocessing architecture 
various external hardware devices used by the stakeholders to communicate data or instructions 
to or from the processing units.’ Id. col. 7 ll. 46–52. The computer can connect to the 
communications controller by means of another machine, a modem. Id. col. 7 ll. 57–60.”).  
 213. Id. at 1307. 
 214. Id. at 1309 (“[S]omeone can use an escrow arrangement in many other applications, 
without computer systems, and even with computers but in other ways without infringing the 
claims.”). 
 215. Id. at 1290. 
 216. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014).  
 217. For example, independent claim 16 of US 5,970,479 recites “a plurality of main data 
processing devices interconnected by at least one data communications link, each said data 
processing device running an operating system and applications software,” “one or more data 
storage devices to which each data processing device has access,” “a plurality of data input/output 
channels providing connection to a plurality of stakeholder locations,” “each said location having 
data processing means,” and “stakeholders inputting to a said data storage device.” US 5,970,479 
at 62:20–34. Independent claim 1 of US 7,725,375 recites a computer configured to “receive a 
transaction from said first party device.” Dependent claim 12 of US 7,725,375 recites the 
limitation that the “computer is further configured to receive a transaction from said second party 
device.” Dependent claim 13 of US 7,725,375 recites “said first party device and said second party 
device include a computer.”  US 7,725,375 at 65:15, 61–62, 65–67.  
 218. Independent claims 14 and 26 of US 7,725,375 recite a computer that is configured to 
“receive a transaction from said first party via said communications controller.” US 7,725,375 at 
66:13–14, 67:10–11. Dependent claims 25 and 37 of US 7,725,375 recite the limitation that the 
computer is further configured “to receive a transaction from said second party . . . via said 
communications controller.” Id. at 66:61–62, 68:1–2. Claim 38 of US 7,725,375 recites “said first 
party device and second party device include a computer.” Id. at 68:4. 
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is “a large system designed to handle the transactions of thousands of 
stakeholders, the input and output data generated by those stakeholders, 
and risk management contact pricing, matching and subsequent 
processing functions.”219 As a technological solution, the distributed 
multiprocessing architecture has specific technical advantages such as 
scalability,220 configurability,221 and adaptability.222 Such technical 
advantages of distributed multiprocessing architectures have also 
enabled other innovations from climate-change modeling223 to 
distributed robotics.224 
 219. US 7,725,375 at 7:34–38. US 5,970,479 at 7:45–49. Admittedly, the role of the 
specification in claim construction is a matter of controversy. While Professor Chiang has 
insightfully characterized the claim construction debate as policy disagreements about the 
appropriate level of abstraction, Chiang may likely be overstating his argument by diminishing 
the problem of linguistic vagueness. See Chiang, supra note 78, at 1130 (“Rather than linguistic 
vagueness, the disagreement between the two claim construction camps [textualism and 
contextualism] is over the permitted level of abstraction. Interpreting claims [contextually] in light 
of the specification—that is, importing limitations from the specification—has the effect of 
reducing the abstractness of a claim and its corresponding scope.”). But see Andrew Chin, The 
Ontological Function of the Patent Document, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 312–13 (2012–2013) 
(arguing that “the written description requirement serves to ensure that the claims are kinds that 
pick out well-defined classes, as is necessary to satisfy the patent system’s criteria of ontological 
commitment . . . [and] to ensure that one who reads the applicant’s claims in light of the 
specification thereby incurs de dicto ontological commitments to those claims according to the 
patent system’s criteria for such commitments.”). 
 220. “The ‘virtual’ level of the system 10 is termed INVENTCO. INVENTCO is a collection 
of one or more potentially interrelated systems, as shown in FIG. 3. The hardware configuration 
shown in FIG. 2, is to be understood both as a realisation for a single INVENTCO system, and 
equally can represent a number of INVENTCO SYSTEMS, where the processing unit 20 is 
common to all and supports a number of communications co-ordination and security units 25, 
others of which are not shown, together with associated external communications devices 70, also 
not shown . . . . Where there are a number of INVENTCO systems, those systems may be inter-
dependent or stand-alone in nature. If inter-dependent, INVENTCO (10) is responsible for 
transactions between those systems.” US 7,725,375 at 8:34–56. US 5,970,479 at 8:44:65 
 221. “The generic system 10 shown in FIG. 1 encompasses many varied configurations, 
relating not only to the number and types of stakeholders, but also the ‘architectures’ realisable 
by the system hardware and software in combination. In that sense the arrangement shown in FIG. 
2 is to be considered only as broadly indicative of one type of hardware configuration that may 
be required to put the invention into effect.” US 7,725,375 at 8:23–29. US 5,970,479 at 8:35–43. 
 222. “INVENTCO and all of its component parts can be legally or geographically domiciled 
in separate countries or states. The supra-national nature of INVENTCO enables the stakeholders 
to avail themselves of the risk management mechanisms independently of legal domicile or other 
such restrictions that are often a feature of some conventional risk management mechanisms, 
subject to meeting certain criteria regarding credit worthiness and such. Indeed, the legal domicile, 
location, ownership and participating stakeholders of INVENTCO, or any of the sub-systems, can 
be continually changing.” US 7,725,375 at 8:57–67. US 5,970,479 at 8:66–9:9. 
 223. For example, Climateprediction.net (CPDN) is a distributed computing project 
developed by Oxford University. See CLIMATEPREDICTION.NET (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.climateprediction.net. 
 224. For example, the Distributed Robotics Laboratory at MIT is developing systems of self-
organizing robots based on distributed algorithms. See DRL WIKI, http://groups.csail.mit.edu/drl 
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Alice misunderstood each claim as a whole because Alice 
misconstrued the recited limitations. For the system claims, Alice 
mischaracterized the recited hardware as generic.225 Consequently, 
Alice construed the system claims at a high level of abstraction as 
simply applying the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.226 
Similarly, Alice also mischaracterized the recited method steps as 
generic.227 Alice construed the method claims at a high level of 
abstraction as simply applying the same abstract idea.228 
In Alice, construing the claims at different levels of abstraction 
yields different results. Construed at a sufficiently high level of 
abstraction, the claims are directed to ineligible subject matter because 
the distributed multiprocessing architecture is tangential to the 
underlying concept of intermediated settlement. Intermediated 
settlement is a fundamental economic practice that does not require 
computers. Evaluated at a lower level of abstraction, the distributed 
multiprocessing architecture is more easily appreciated as a 
technological solution that solves a technological problem. Therefore, 
evaluating the claimed invention at the appropriate level of abstraction 
is pivotal. 
Accordingly, the first step of Mayo’s framework should be 
clarified as the determination of the appropriate level of abstraction for 
claim construction.229 Contrary to Alice, the first step is not a 
determination of whether the claims at issue are directed to an abstract 
/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page (last modified May 22, 2014, 3:29 PM). 
 225. “But what petitioner characterizes as specific hardware . . . is purely functional and 
generic.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014).  
 226. “[T]he system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to 
implement the same idea.” Id. 
 227. “Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each 
step of the process is “[p]urely conventional. . . . In short, each step does no more than require a 
generic computer to perform generic computer functions.” Id. at 15. 
 228. “Instead, the claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction 
to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer.” 
Id. 
 229. Professor Chiang compellingly argues that the “task of defining patent scope—
translating an embodiment into a protected idea—is a classic levels of abstraction problem. The 
choice between levels of abstraction as a means of expressing some idea or principle presents 
problems of arbitrariness, a difficulty well known in many areas of law. The problem is worse in 
patent law, however, because courts have not even acknowledged the nature of the problem. 
Instead, courts routinely treat the idea and embodiment in a patent as the same thing so that the 
correct level of abstraction to express the idea is made to seem self-evident. This only makes the 
task of ascertaining patent scope more difficult by obscuring the process by which one level of 
abstraction is chosen from the many available.” See Chiang, supra note 78, at 1100. 
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idea.230 At some level, all inventions embody abstract ideas.231 Further, 
ideas are found at different levels of abstraction, as Altai observed.232 
Implicit in this reformulation of the first step of Mayo’s framework is 
a workable definition of an abstract idea. To be sure, some abstract 
ideas are undeniably fundamental building blocks of human ingenuity, 
such as the concept of an escrow or hedging. This article argues that 
less fundamental abstract ideas at lower levels of abstraction (that may 
also be building blocks) can be fruitfully characterized as 
abstractions—that is, the products of the creative act of abstraction.233 
Admittedly, copyright law has recognized the ad hoc nature of a 
balancing of interests in the level-of-abstraction determination. There 
is no bright-line rule on determining the appropriate level of abstraction 
and, concomitantly, the proper scope of copyright protection. Learned 
Hand maintained that, in the determination of the boundary between 
protectable and non-protectable subject matter, “[n]obody has ever 
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”234 In formulating 
a nearly identical three-part test that prefigured the abstraction-
filtration-comparison test advanced by Altai, the court in Lotus Dev. 
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l observed that “no principle can be 
stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and 
has borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must therefore inevitably be 
ad hoc. In another context, Hand described such ‘ad hoc’ decision 
making as ‘fiat.’”235  
Even so, this article argues that the level-of-abstraction analysis 
of useful artifacts in patent law (as compared to purely textual, literary 
works in copyright law) may admit of a more predictable approach or 
principle.236 This article submits that the principled approach should 
 230. “First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
ineligible concepts.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
 231. “At some level [of abstraction], ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply . . . abstract ideas.’” Id. at 2354. 
 232. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text. 
 234. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 235. 740 F. Supp. 37, 60 (D. Mass. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 236. Although ultimately incomplete, as discussed below, Professor Morris’s notion of 
“action” and Professor Chin’s notion of “causal power” suggest that the hermeneutics, as it were, 
of the meaning of useful artifacts (and claims thereof) is more constrained than compared to the 
explication of the meaning of literary works. See infra notes 238–50 and accompanying text; see 
also Knuth, Structured Programing, supra note 169, at 294. But see Chiang supra note 78, at 1123 
(“Within the spectrum of abstractions, each description is as equally accurate as any other. As a 
matter of formalist principle, there is almost no limit on how far one can move up or down the 
abstractions ladder. Between claiming every last detail of the specification embodiment and 
omitting all details and claiming a fundamental principle, there is no legally principled limit. The 
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focus on or emphasize the role of human agency rather than an essential 
property of the artifact itself—designed artifacts are useful precisely 
because of the human agency and purpose that inheres in the artifact.237 
As an example of the former approach emphasizing the role of human 
agency, this article argues that, by carefully inquiring into the creative 
process of writing software, courts can uncover design choices which 
suggest an appropriate level of abstraction. Exemplifying the latter 
approach is Professor Chin’s article, The Ontological Function of the 
Patent Document, which, on my reading, represents the one of the most 
well-considered theoretical approaches to the subject-matter inquiry.238 
However, Chin may be pursuing a theoretically more difficult direction 
by positing the existence of an “essential causal power” that serves as 
the basis for an “essential causation requirement.” The requirement, 
criteria of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness provide no definitive answer. Nor do 
enablement and written description provide an answer: these two related doctrines are both 
internally contradictory and thus provide no coherent principle at all. Nonetheless, courts must 
and do draw lines on the permissible level of abstraction. The lines, however, are drawn silently, 
without informing the public and litigants of any coherent principle.”) (citations omitted). 
 237. Rather than implying a kind of vitalism, this is simply to say that artifacts cannot be 
understood without understanding its purpose and design.  
 238. Generally, in searching for textual “clues” in case law, commentators have missed the 
opportunity to think about deeper, cohering principles. Consequently, such “clues” yield a 
disparate collection of rules that remain conceptually problematic. See, e.g., Richard H. Stern, 
Mayo v. Prometheus: No Patents on Conventional Implementations of Natural Principles and 
Fundamental Truths, 34 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 502, 514 (2012) (arguing that “case law 
gives us ample and powerful clues [for a positive test of patent-eligibility] . . . . The 
implementation of the principle must add to the principle more than just the conventional 
expedients that scientists or artisans in the relevant field know and use, or the implementation 
should at least purport to do so. . . . A novel apparatus helps. Novel co-operation or co-action is 
very helpful. . . . The claims should not be open-ended and exceed what the inventor has taught 
the public to do to exploit the principle . . . . That is how Prometheus teaches us to recognise when 
a claim ‘amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.’”). But see, e.g., 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON 265, 268 
(1977) (arguing that the “[o]ne reason the prospect function of the patent system may have been 
so long overlooked is that the ‘hornbook’ rule is very misleading—the inventor may not claim 
more than he has invented, and the claim marks the outer bounds of his rights . . . . But the rule is 
misleading, because the invention as claimed in the patent claims and the physical embodiment 
of the invention are two quite different things.”); Chiang, supra note 78, at 1152 (observing that 
“some degree of control beyond the precise embodiment is necessary for patent incentives to 
work. If the patent’s scope is confined to precise replication of the first working embodiment, then 
pirates would quickly learn to copy the principle or the heart of the patent without replicating the 
precise embodiment.”); Chin, supra note 219, at 273–74 (observing that “[a] widespread 
misconception about patent claims is that they are merely sets of embodiments, so that certain 
doctrines about claim scope are reducible to set-theoretic propositions . . . it is an imprecise and 
inadequate ontological description because while the definition of a set necessarily determines a 
patent claim’s elements, the language of a claim does not determine which, if any, of its 
embodiments exist. Conversely, the number of existing patent claim embodiments has no effect 
on the claim’s scope. All empty sets are identical, yet there are many distinct patent claims with 
no existing embodiments.”) (citations omitted). 
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according to Chin, provides “a precise criterion for distinguishing 
between a patent-ineligible abstract idea and a patent-eligible practical 
method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect.”239  
The problem with Chin’s approach is that his narrow conception 
of the causal power of artifacts is devoid of human agency. Chin 
overlooks the role of human agency which, as this article has argued, 
is determinative of the appropriate level of abstraction. Chin submits 
that “[g]enerally accepted explanatory [causal] principles governing 
the involvement of [real-world] resources in the essential causal powers 
of the claim’s embodiments may range from the conservation laws of 
physics to the scheduling disciplines implemented in operating 
systems.”240 However, by reifying the implementation of scheduling 
disciplines as if it were a causal law of nature, Chin overlooks the 
design choices in the creative process. Those design choices, as this 
article has shown, are not only contingent but are also determinative of 
how the scheduling disciplines are integrated into the software 
architecture as a whole.241 Chin suggests that any software-
implemented invention that achieves a practical and useful effect is 
amenable to explanation by a single causal account in terms of real-
world resources such as “CPU cycles, network bandwidth, memory, 
disk space, and battery life.”242 However, no causal account is complete 
without an explanation of how such real-world resources are mediated 
by human agency that inheres in software.243 In sum, Chin avoids the 
 239. Chin, supra note 219, at 324. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text. See also Feenberg, supra note 23, at 
12 (observing that “in years to come the technical experts will forget the politics behind their 
reformed designs and when new demands appear will defend them as a product of pure and 
objective knowledge of nature!”). 
 242. Chin, supra note 219, at 324.  
 243. Rather than the philosophical position of scientific realism, which Chin argues is an 
epistemological commitment by patent law to a mind-independent world, perhaps the notion of 
irrealism (as distinct from anti-realism) may be more fruitful in the analysis of human agency that 
inheres in software. See Chin, supra note 219, at 295–99 (submitting that the patent system is 
committed to scientific realism). But see Dick Hamlet, Science, Mathematics, Computer Science, 
Software Engineering, 55 COMPUT. J. 99, 103 (2012) (“[T]here is reason to doubt there will ever 
be a science of software. Programs and programming have a made-up, abstract nature that is 
disconnected from external constraints. There can be no software natural laws because the whole 
thing is an arbitrary human invention. No statement about software could be falsified by an 
experiment, because there is no ‘reality’ for software that decides truth.”) (footnote omitted). The 
notion of irrealism has been explored by scholars, albeit not in the context of software. For 
example, in distinguishing his conception of the irrealism from that of Nelson Goodman who first 
introduced the philosophical position, sociologist Nikolas Rose writes, “[m]y own irrealism is 
technical, not psyhologistic. It is technical in so far as it asserts that thought constructs its irreal 
worlds through very material procedures. Thought, that is to say, becomes real by harnessing 
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level-of-abstraction problem and the question of human agency by 
focusing solely on the external aspects of an artifact.244 The 
determination of the appropriate level of abstraction, a critical step in 
the eligibility inquiry, should instead conceive of artifacts as animated 
by human agency.  
In comparison, artifice and action are two persistent themes that 
Professor Morris perceives in disparate subject matter upheld as patent-
eligible.245 Artifice is “roughly defined as perceived degree of 
alteration through human intervention.” and action is “roughly defined 
as new operation or activity through human intervention.”246 According 
to Morris, artifice and action can serve as criteria for distinguishing 
between patent-ineligible and patent-eligible subject matter. Morris 
argues that “[e]xplicitly adopting artifice and action as the standard for 
patentable technology offers a number of benefits. The artifice-plus-
action standard allows patent law to move away from wrangling over 
what an ‘abstract idea’ or ‘process’ is or from deciding whether an 
invention is truly a machine or just cleverly claimed as such.”247 Morris 
is correct in submitting that artifice and action are matters of degree: 
“All patentable subject matter displays some threshold degree of 
artifice [and] . . . at least a threshold degree of action.”248 However, 
Morris overlooks the possibility that different artifice and different 
actions can co-exist (or not) at different levels of abstraction, as this 
article has shown.249 Therefore, while Morris recognizes the important 
itself to a practice of inscription, calculation, and action.” NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM, 
REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 32 (1999) (emphasis added); see also NEW MATERIALISMS, 
ONTOLOGY, AGENCY, AND POLITICS 6–7 (Diana H. Coole & Samantha Frost eds., 2010) 
(observing that “we are finding our environment materially and conceptually reconstituted in ways 
that pose profound and unprecedented normative questions” that call for a ‘new materialist’ 
critique of modernity’s presumptions about agency and causation). 
 244. Kroes et al. submit a relevant distinction between “thin” and “thick” conceptions of 
function, wherein the latter conception recognizes that “at some level in some way functions are 
connected with intentions.” Kroes et al., supra note 27, at 113 (Any physical system will exhibit 
a reliable association between inputs and outputs … and thus can be ascribed a thin function. But 
how does that specific function relate to how we want that system to behave. As long as any 
reliable association between inputs and outputs can pass for a (thin) function of the object, it is 
not clear how such a thin function can establish a connection between the actual behavior of a 
system and its intended behavior . . . . There are no relevance criteria and therefore an infinity of 
functions can be associated with an artifact. Again, the interpretation of outputs as ends does not 
solve this problem. In the first place, since any kind of output becomes an end . . . .”).  
 245. Emily Michiko Morris, What is “Technology,” 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 24, 65 
(2014).  
 246. Id. at 25.  
 247. Id.  
 248. Id.  
 249. See, e.g., supra notes 155–177 and accompanying text.  
 
13_ARTICLE_LUAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2015  11:27 PM 
368 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
role of human agency (by including “human intervention” in the 
definitions of artifice and action), like Chin, Morris overlooks the level-
of-abstraction problem.250 Ultimately, Morris’s approach is inherently 
indeterminate.   
Therefore, the first step of Mayo’s framework should be clarified 
as the determination of the appropriate level of abstraction by focusing 
on human agency and by inquiring into the creative process. As such, 
the relative functional concern of the eligibility inquiry, as articulated 
by Mayo, is not a free-ranging inquiry. The dissent in the Federal 
Circuit warned that “[a] court cannot go hunting for abstractions by 
ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the 
patentee actually claims.”251 Hunting for abstractions with its erroneous 
analogy to Bilski, the Court in Alice overlooked the technological 
significance of the limitations at issue. In Alice, if the Court had 
considered the claimed invention at a lower level of abstraction, 
perhaps the Court would have been more receptive to the design choice 
of a distributed multiprocessing architecture as a technological 
solution. At the appropriate level of abstraction, the significance of the 
claimed limitations and any improvement to a technology, technical 
field, or the functioning of the computer itself become more apparent.  
B. Technical Aspect of Mayo’s Framework, Step 2: The Search 
for the Inventive Concept 
1. Method Claims 
Alice observed that “[s]tating an abstract idea while adding the 
words ‘apply it’ is not enough for patent eligibility.”252 Alice held that 
“the claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an 
instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.”253  
 250. Admittedly, Morris does recognize another dimension in the determination of artifice 
and action which seems to suggest that claims should be construed at an appropriate level of 
abstraction. According to Morris, not only are the constituent elements of an invention 
characterized according to their level of artifice and action but also “their respective roles affects 
whether the invention as a whole displays adequate artifice and action.” Morris, supra note 245, 
at 63. However, it remains entirely unclear how the qualities of artifice and action of the 
constituent elements translate to that of the invention as a whole. (According to Morris, artifice 
and action are scalar (i.e., one-dimensional) qualities. Id. at 35. As such, without another 
mediating concept, the invention as a whole can never be more (or less) than the sum of its parts.)  
 251. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1298 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 134 
S. Ct. 734 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 252. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (citation omitted). 
 253. Id. at 15. 
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The “apply it” formulation is imprecise.254 As discussed above, 
the formulation does not adequately capture the difference between the 
claims at issue in Flook and in Diehr.255 Both the patent-eligible claim 
in Diehr and the patent-ineligible claim in Flook simply apply the 
underlying formulas.256 This article argues that Flook and in Diehr can 
be harmonized by construing their respective claims at the appropriate 
level of abstraction.257 Similarly, in Alice, the “apply it” formulation 
obscures the proper analysis of the claims at issue. The proper analysis 
involves construing the claims at the appropriate level of abstraction.  
Consider the “shadow record” limitation at a lower level of 
abstraction vis-à-vis the fundamental economic idea of intermediated 
settlement.258 Like the macros and parameter lists in Altai, the shadow 
record in Alice is an external aspect of a hidden architecture. As a 
factual matter, the Court’s characterization of the shadow record as 
amounting to “‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply 
the abstract idea” is incorrect.259  
The shadow record is a proxy—a term of art that describes a 
software design pattern. The “Gang of Four,” in their seminal book, 
Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software, 
described design patterns as “simple and elegant solutions to specific 
problems in . . . . software design.”260 As a technological solution, the 
proxy pattern introduces an intermediate abstraction (e.g., a proxy or 
shadow) to achieve specific technical advantages. The “Gang of Four” 
described the proxy pattern as an optimizable means to “[p]rovide a 
surrogate or placeholder for another object to control access to 
 254. Id. at 11 (“Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible application 
requires ‘more than simply stat[ing] the [abstract idea] while adding the words ‘apply it.’”); Id. at 
13 (“Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it’ is not enough for patent 
eligibility.”) (citation omitted).  
 255. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra notes 187–190 and accompanying text. 
 258. “The representative method claim in this case recites the following steps: (1) ‘creating’ 
shadow records for each counter party to a transaction; (2) “obtaining” start-of-day balances based 
on the parties’ real-world accounts at exchange institutions; (3) ‘adjusting’ the shadow records as 
transactions are entered, allowing only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient 
resources; and (4) issuing irrevocable end-of-day instructions to the exchange institutions to carry 
out the permitted transactions.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014).  
 259. Id. at 15. Commentators have generally accepted the Court’s erroneous characterization 
at face value. 
 260. GoF, supra note 107, at xi (advising readers that the implementation of design patterns 
“might take a little more work than ad hoc solutions. But the extra effort invariably pays dividends 
in increased flexibility and reusability. Once you understand the design patterns and have had an 
‘Aha!’ (and not just a ‘Huh?’) experience with them, you won’t ever thinking about … [software] 
design in the same way.”). 
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it . . . . The proxy pattern introduces a level of indirection when 
accessing an object . . . allow[ing] additional housekeeping tasks [e.g., 
checking for overdrafts] when an object is accessed.”261 For example, 
a real-time computer system may utilize a proxy or shadow to solve 
timing or “concurrency” problems that arise when multiple tasks 
require access to a shared resource.262 In contrast to the adapter, as 
discussed above, which provides a different interface to the object it 
adapts, a proxy provides the same interface as the object it mediates.263 
For the real-time settlement system at issue in Alice, the proxy or 
shadow record encodes a specific settlement mechanism (e.g., 
checking for overdrafts) and account structure.264 For example, the 
prior art of record describes an alternative settlement mechanism that 
utilizes a queuing mechanism whereby uncovered payment orders can 
be held pending.265 The prior art also contemplates a third alternative 
settlement mechanism utilizing “daylight” overdraft credits that allow 
for short-lived overdrafts.266 In contrast, the claims at issue in Alice 
recite the limitation: 
[F]or every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, 
adjusting the respective shadow credit record or shadow debit 
record, allowing only those transactions that do not result in the 
value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the 
shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place 
in chronological order . . . .267 
According to the prior art of record, “[t]he debate over what constitutes 
an optimal settlement arrangement, however, has only recently been 
started. So far, it has not led to conclusive results . . . In reality, the 
 261. Id. at 207–10. 
 262. See, e.g., Dimitrios I. Kosmopoulos, A Design Framework for Sensor Integration in 
Robotic Applications, in INDUSTRIAL ROBOTICS 1, 11 (Kin-Huat Low ed., 2007) (“A good trade-
off between flexibility and usability is provided if we build a library of components. . . . The 
implementation of the design decisions at the control object layer . . . . The implementation of the 
design framework uses the services of a communication layer … which has to be deterministic to 
cover the needs of a real-time industrial system. . . . A method for communication of modules that 
reside in different processes is the ‘proxy’ pattern.”) (emphases added). 
 263. GoF, supra note 107, at 216 (“However, a proxy used for access protection might refuse 
to perform an operation that the subject will perform so its interface may be effectively a subset 
of the subject’s.”). 
 264. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375 col.29 l.2–29; U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 col.24 
l.66–25:24; see also Christian Vital, The Architecture of Real Time Gross Settlement Systems, in 
GLOBAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS 23, 28, 31–32 (1996). See, e.g., Office Action Appendix, 
Application No. 11/166387 (Mar. 30, 2010).  
 265. Vital, supra note 264, at 28.  
 266. Id. 
 267. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 claim 12 (emphases added).  
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issues are complex. The comparison of benefits and costs is a difficult 
task . . . the question is likely to remain controversial for some time to 
come.”268  
The utilization of the proxy or shadow record in the context of 
real-time settlement systems produces new complications.269 For 
example, institutions that initiated rejected transactions will have to 
resubmit the transactions at a later time and, for large payment 
volumes, this solution presupposes the existence of automated queuing 
mechanisms within the participating institutions.270 Thus, the shadow 
record (like the design choices in Altai, as discussed above) encodes a 
particular tradeoff of benefits and costs in the complex endeavor of 
designing real-time settlement systems.  
Therefore, contrary to Alice, the method claims do not simply 
implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on “some 
unspecified, generic computer.”271 As a factual matter, the Court’s 
characterization of the shadow record as amounting to “electronic 
recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a computer” is 
incorrect. Probed more deeply, at the appropriate level of abstraction, 
the shadow record is revealed to be the external aspect of a more 
complex architecture. The Court’s reductive mischaracterization is 
akin to describing a towering architecture only in terms of the pressure 
it exerts on the ground. 
2. System and Media Claims  
The Court’s two-paragraph analysis of the system and media 
claims is double-pronged.272 The first and second paragraphs are 
analytically distinct. The second paragraph is not merely an alternative 
and equivalent re-articulation, despite the Court's language (i.e., “Put 
another way”). The first paragraph focuses on hardware limitations of 
the system/media claims. By contrast, the second paragraph focuses on 
a comparison between the method and system/media claims. The first 
paragraph considers the system/media claims on their own terms. By 
contrast, the second paragraph construes the system/media claims in 
 268. Id. at 23. 
 269. Professor Feenberg observes that “the process of decontextualizing and 
recontextualizing technical objects sometimes results in unexpected problems . . . in simplifying, 
technological projects . . . produce new complications. This is why context matters.” See 
Feenberg, supra note 23, at 10–11 (submitting “a seventh paradox of complexity which can be 
succinctly stated as: Simplification complicates.”). 
 270. Vital, supra note 264, at 28.  
 271. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360.  
 272. Id.  
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reference to the method claims, based on the same level of 
abstraction.273  
The analysis articulated in the first paragraph involves the more 
difficult technical and normative questions of whether the recited 
hardware provides meaningful limitations. Factually, the Court’s 
conclusions are incorrect. As discussed above, construed at a lower 
level of abstraction, the limitations are directed to distributed 
multiprocessing architectures. As such, the limitations are meaningful 
because they are directed to technological solutions that solve 
technological problems.  
By contrast, the analysis in the second paragraph leads to a 
foregone conclusion because the system/media claims are construed in 
reference to the ineligible method claims. The Court held that the 
“computer components [are] configured to implement the same 
[abstract] idea [of intermediated settlement].”274 The Court construed 
the hardware limitations in the system/media claims at the same high 
level of abstraction. At this height of abstraction, the architectural 
details are easily overlooked as generic and tangential. Consequently, 
the Court invoked the warning against making patent eligibility 
“depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”275  
However, the problem with the “draftsman’s art” formulation is 
that it is meaningless. All claims are drafting efforts attempting to 
monopolize (to varying degrees) the underlying ideas. Yet courts 
continue to rely on the formulation as if it provides a meaningful 
distinction.276 Just as the “apply it” formulation is imprecise,277 so the 
“draftsman’s art” characterization is a problematic formulation that 
does not adequately capture the technical significance (or 
insignificance) of the claimed limitations at issue. Courts can more 
meaningfully characterize claimed limitations in terms of the degree of 
technical necessity (based on an appropriate level of abstraction).278 
Technically descriptive characterizations of claimed limitations are 
critical because, at bottom, normative prescriptions depend on accurate 
descriptions. 
 273. “. . . the system claims recited . . . to implement the same idea [as the method claims].” 
Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Judicial language does not provide guidance for distinguishing between claims that 
“depend simply” on the draftsman’s art and claims that “depend not so simply” on the draftsman’s 
art.  
 277. See supra notes 254–257 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 187–196 and accompanying text. 
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C. Normative Aspect of Mayo’s Framework, Step 2: The 
Changing Nature of the Machine 
The normative concern finds expression in various modes. One 
mode of expression is speculative.279 Speculation is inevitable because 
the eligibility inquiry, as articulated by Mayo, is a relative functional 
concern about the creative value of a discovery and the future risks of 
pre-emption.280 The normative concern also finds expression in a 
propositional mode. For example, Alice held that patent law should 
promote improvements in a technology, a technical field, or the 
functioning of the computer itself.281 While the speculative mode (like 
all forecasting efforts) is inherently uncertain, the propositional mode 
admits of problems that can be remedied.  
This part argues that Alice, exemplifying the latter mode of 
normative expression, is problematic because of (1) an erroneous 
understanding of a particular machine (e.g., computers and the software 
that programs them) and (2) misconceptions about technology and the 
nature of modern machines. Each will be discussed in turn below. 
Informed by a more descriptively accurate conception of technology, 
this part will propose a more fruitful approach to the normative inquiry.  
Alice’s normative criterion regarding “improvements in the 
functioning of the computer itself” is problematic because the 
formulation is based on a misconception of computer technology. As a 
descriptive phrase, “the functioning of the computer itself” is imprecise 
for at least two reasons. First, if the function of computers is inherently 
governed by software, then, contrary to patent doctrine, improvements 
in software per se necessarily improves the functioning of the computer 
itself.282 Second, the pronoun itself seems to emphasize a distinction 
 279. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (“For aught that we now know some future 
inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance 
by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination 
set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention may be less complicated-less liable to get 
out of order-less expensive in construction, and in its operation.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 68 (1972) (“The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ 
licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing 
machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012) (“[the claims] threaten to inhibit the 
development of more refined treatment recommendations (like that embodied in Mayo’s test), that 
combine Prometheus’ correlations with later discovered features of metabolites, human 
physiology or individual patient characteristics . . . including later discovered processes that 
measure metabolite levels in new ways . . . these patents tie up too much future use of laws of 
nature . . . .”).  
 280. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 281. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014).  
 282. See supra note 26. 
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that is largely obsolete in the age of cloud computing. Computers are 
no longer self-contained machines. Processing is distributed and 
diffused through networks of interconnected machines. One example 
is the distributed multiprocessing architecture recited by the claims at 
issue in Alice.  
 Alice’s erroneous and outdated understanding of computers is 
compounded with its misconceptions about technology. The 
juxtaposition, in Alice, between the terms technology and technical 
field recalls a history that is directly relevant to the focus of this 
article.283 In its original, pre-modern usage, technology named a field 
of study.284 Karl Marx was one of the first writers to use the term 
technology in its modern sense.285 In its modern usage, technology 
means something much more abstract and elusive. Before turning to 
the significance of Alice’s use of the term technology, this part will 
examine the conceptual and discursive changes revealed by the history 
of the term.  
Technology is a critical term in patent law.286 For instance, 
Professor Willoughby submits that “the whole edifice of patent law is 
arguably built on the conceptual foundation of something called 
‘technology.’”287 Yet, the notion of technology remains largely 
intuitive and undefined rigorously.288 Generally, commentators lament 
the elusiveness of the term technology289 or unsuccessfully attempt a 
definition.290 This article takes a different approach by examining the 
 283. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359.  
 284. Leo Marx, Technology, The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 51 TECH. AND 
CULTURE 561, 575 (2010). 
 285. Id. at 570. 
 286. Arguably, patent law has used the word technology to mean something narrower and 
more closely related to the traditional concept of machine.  
 287. See Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does Technology Really Matter in Patent Law? 
A Comparative Analysis of Doctrines of Appropriate Patentable Subject Matter in American and 
European Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B. J. 63, 137 (2009). 
 288. Id. 
 289. See, e.g., Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject 
Matter Eligibility, 1300 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 1, 44 (Oct. 26, 2005), available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/guidelinesl01_20051026.pdf 
(“[A]ny attempts to define what is ‘in the technological arts’ raises more questions than it appears 
to answer.”).  
 290. For example, Professor Willoughby proposed a definition of technology that is based 
on the problematic and multifarious notion of efficiency. See Willoughby, supra note 287, at 126 
(“A technology is an artifact or system of artifacts, either tangible or intangible, which functions 
as a means towards the attainment of predetermined ends in a rational, efficient and causal 
manner.”) (emphasis added). But see Feenberg, supra note 23, at 7 (“There is a corollary of the 
paradox of the origin. I call this fourth paradox, the paradox of the frame and formulate it as 
follows: efficiency does not explain success, success explains efficiency . . . there is no general 
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history of the term because, ultimately, it is the changing nature of the 
machine that has confused the patent law jurisprudence on subject-
matter eligibility.291 Thus, by revealing the changing nature of the 
machine, the history of technology—as machine and as word—can 
guide jurisprudence towards the right direction.292 
Technology filled a semantic void. In nineteenth-century 
discourse about the increasingly-wide-ranging effects of machine 
power, technology filled a void left open by conventional terms such as 
machine, mechanism, and mechanic arts.293 The nineteenth century 
witnessed a transformation in the character and complexity of machines 
into something recognizable today as technological systems. The 
railroad system, telegraph network, and power grids were complex 
configurations of material artifacts and human organizations. 
rule under which paths of development can be explained. Explanation by efficiency is a little like 
explaining the presence of pictures in a museum by the fact that they all have frames. Of course 
all technologies must be more or less efficient, but that does not explain why they are present in 
our technical environment.”). 
 291. Similarly, recalling Raymond Williams’s famous study, in Culture and Society (1983), 
of the striking interdependence in the relations between certain keywords (e.g., class, industry, 
democracy) and fundamental changes in society and culture, MIT Professor Leo Marx submits 
that the emergence of technology as a keyword can be employed to chart the changing character 
of contemporary society and culture. Marx, Technology, The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 
supra note 284, at 563.  
 292. In writing about technology, commentators have generally assumed that (1) technology 
as machine has not fundamentally changed, and/or that (2) technology as a word does not have a 
discursive history which reflects that fundamental change. These assumptions often detract from 
the worthwhile thesis that patent law should understand technology as a means for broader 
improvements in society. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield & Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory of 
Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. (2007) (proposing a general theory of law and 
technology that includes “substantive” theories of technology, as articulated by Karl Marx, 
Herbert Marcuse, and Jacques Ellul); Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? 
Changing Visions of Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 794, 802, 
813 (2008) (insightfully observing a shift in subject-matter jurisprudence from a discourse based 
on the nature/artifice distinction to a rhetoric of science and technology, a shift that the author 
incorrectly argues should be reversed, as “some categories [of eligible subject matter, including 
software-implemented inventions] seem entirely disconnected from the natural world.”); John R. 
Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
35, 81 (1995) (arguing that “the work of Martin Heidegger provides the philosophical basis for 
rejecting patent law’s view of technology as a dominating, neutral, inevitable force.”). The 
foregoing representative theses, searching for alternative philosophic bases for patent law, are 
reactions to an over-reliance by judges and scholars on narrow economic and utilitarian 
justifications. Whether these reactions yield specific and workable proposals for reform is an open 
question. However, these reactions are, I believe, part of the growing realization—within and 
outside the legal profession—of the vulnerabilities (and commensurate resourcefulness) of the 
human species. The project to reconceive the foundations of patent law is a pressing one, 
especially in an era in which technological development and its impacts are so far-reaching that 
the body of law solely focused on the promotion of technological innovation cannot afford to 
remain neutral.  
 293. Marx, Technology, The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, supra note 284, at 563. 
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Celebrated and iconic technological innovations such as the steam 
engine were only the most visible aspect of wider transformations. For 
example, the locomotive was made possible not just by the network of 
railroads and the ancillary infrastructures for the production of parts 
and materials. Technological innovations also required modern 
institutions such as large corporations capable of harnessing labor and 
capital.294 As discrete machines were transformed into more diffused 
and complex technological systems, the term technology served to 
describe a reality in which the artifactual and socio-economic 
components became inextricable.295 The deep interpenetration of the 
machine and the human dimensions of technology was something 
entirely new. For Marx’s contemporaries who witnessed firsthand this 
profound transformation, their vision had got ahead of their 
language.296 Supplanting the outmoded lexicon of the mechanic arts, 
the word technology filled a semantic void.297 
The development of the concept of technology is inseparable from 
its discursive history. Just as technology as a word describes something 
diffused and atmospheric, technology as a concept is rarified and 
abstract. While mechanic arts conjures the soiled hands in the 
workshop, technology seems purified of physicality.298 While 
industrial arts is mired in the mundane practicality of work, technology 
seems elevated to the realm of higher learning and fine arts.299 
Technology is the work of highly-educated specialists, blurring the 
boundaries between the technical and the cultural.  
The modern concept of technology assumed normative 
dimensions. In contrast to the Enlightenment notion of machine power 
as the means to a more just, more peaceful society, technology became 
an end in itself.300 The modern technocratic notion of progress is based 
 294. Professor Leo Marx observed that “[i]t is noteworthy that the concept of technology 
gained currency during the ‘incorporation of America.’” Id. at 575 (“[M]achines became working 
parts of a dynamic system, and the motives for change, the source of industrial dynamism, lay not 
in the inanimate machine but in the economic necessities perceived by its owners.” (quoting ALAN 
TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA 55 (1982))). 
 295. Id. (observing “the blurring of the boundary between the material (physical, or 
artifactual) components of these large socio-technological systems and the other, bureaucratic and 
ideological components. Even more significant, perhaps, is the erosion of the ‘outer’ boundaries, 
as it were, those separating the whole technological system from the surrounding society and 
culture.”). 
 296. LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL 
IN AMERICA 166 (2000). 
 297. Marx, Technology, The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, supra note 284, at 574. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Leo Marx, The Idea of “Technology” and Postmodern Pessimism, in DOES 
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on the faith that once technical mastery is achieved, the rest will take 
care of itself.301 Technology has become at once a self-justifying object 
(i.e., an end and a thing) and an autonomous causal agent of history.302 
As an object without a specifying adjective, technology invites endless 
reification.303 As a disembodied signifier lacking a referent, technology 
is invested with metaphysical properties and potencies.304 
Judges are susceptible to these interpretative or philosophic errors. 
Consider Alice. Rather than understood as a product of human 
creativity, the claimed technology at issue in Alice has become an 
object largely inaccessible to analysis. The significance of the shadow 
record is reduced to the basic function of a computer, to a mere aspect 
of a thing. Alice not only reflects the contemporary tendency to reify 
technology, but Alice also reflects the contemporary technocratic 
notion of progress. The unqualified normative criterion of 
improvement in technology is a self-justifying end in itself.  
How can patent law reflect the changing nature of the machine? 
One approach is suggested by the schematic notion of second-order 
machines.305 The notion has gained much purchase among 
technologists.306 As Professor Allen explains, “[f]irst-order machines 
TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGIAL DETEMINISM 237, 250–51 
(Merritt Roe Smit & Leo Marx eds. 1994) (“The idea of history as a record of progress driven by 
the application of science-based knowledge was not simply another idea among many. Rather it 
was a figurative concept lodged at the center of what became, sometime after 1750, the dominant 
secular world-picture of Western culture. That it was no mere rationale for domination by a 
privileged bourgeoisie is suggested by the fact that it was as fondly embraced by the hostile critics 
as by the ardent exponents of industrial capitalism. . . . To later followers of Marx and Engels, the 
most apt name of that power leading to communism, the political goal of progress— of history—
is ‘technology.’”).  
 301. Leo Marx, Does Improved Technology Mean Progress?, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Jan. 
1987, at 37. 
 302. Marx, The Idea of “Technology” and Postmodern Pessimism, supra note 300, at 251.  
 303. Marx, Technology, The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, supra note 284 at 576. 
 304. Marx, The Idea of “Technology” and Postmodern Pessimism, supra note 300, at 249.  
 305. The notion is attributed to Grant. A. Whatmough who introduced the concept in 1976 
in an unpublished paper, Money, Machines, Energy, and Wealth. See Grant. A. Whatmough, 
Money, Machines, Energy, and Wealth, in LIVING WITH THE EARTH (Kent A. Peacock ed. 1996). 
The notion of second-order machines is a more fruitful characterization of programmable 
computers than the false distinction between general- and special-purpose computers. See supra 
note 26.  
 306. See, e.g., Christopher G. Langton, Artificial Life, in SFI STUDIES IN THE SCIENCES OF 
COMPLEXITY 1, 11 (Christopher Langton ed., 1988) (“Various threads of technological 
development—programmable controllers, calculating engines, and the formal theory of 
machines—have come together in the general purpose, stored program computer. Programmable 
computers are extremely general behavior generators. They have no intrinsic behavior of their 
own. Without programs, they are like formless matter. They must be told how to behave. By 
submitting a program to a computer—that is: by giving it a formal specification for a machine— 
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are devices that extend human capabilities by exploiting a mechanical 
advantage. . . . A second-order machine is an assembly of first-order 
machines, coupled to produce a multiplying effect.”307 A second-order 
machine is a system or nested systems of systems of first-order 
machines. According to Allen, technology is a “threshold 
phenomenon” that arises once second-order machines begin to 
predominate wider economies.308  
The foregoing schematization has several advantages.309 First, the 
schematization reveals more clearly what is at stake in the eligibility 
inquiry for first-order and second-order machines—the natural world 
and/or the artifactual world of human ingenuity, respectively. Courts 
have been more explicit about what is at stake for second-order 
machines. The normative inquiry for second-order machines focuses 
on how machines interface to other machines, how machines are 
enmeshed into wider systems within a technologized, artifactual world, 
a world made possible by human ingenuity. Courts have expressed the 
normative concern about hampering human ingenuity by invoking the 
notion of “building blocks.”310 As second-order machines, modern 
technologies are (re)configurations and (re)combinations of 
components or “building blocks.”311 As discussed below, the “building 
block” concern lends itself most directly to the speculative mode.312  
we are telling it to behave as if it were the machine specified by the program. The computer then 
‘emulates’ that more specific machine in the performance of the desired task. Its great power lies 
in its plasticity of behavior. If we can provide a step-by-step specification for a specific kind of 
behavior, the chameleon-like computer will exhibit that behavior. Computers should be viewed 
as second-order machines-given the formal specification of a first-order machine, they will 
‘become’ that machine. Thus, the space of possible machines is directly available for study, at the 
cost of a mere formal description: computers ‘realize’ abstract machines.”) (emphasis added).  
 307. ALLEN, supra note 122, at 107 (emphasis added). 
 308. Id. at 106–08. 
 309. With their Procrustean tendency, schemas and classifications should invite suspicion. 
The burden of this part is to show that, whatever its deficiencies, the foregoing schematization 
can be fruitfully employed in the eligibility inquiry. The foregoing schematization may also serve 
as a counterexample to Professor Peter Yu’s thesis that formalisms in patent law are inherently 
oversimplifications that reduce the cognitive burdens on generalist judges. Peter Lee, Patent Law 
and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 82 (2010) (submitting that “the inquiry-truncating nature 
of formalism limits the universe of technological facts that judges must consider in deciding patent 
issues.”). 
 310. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 
(2012); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014). 
 311. John Lienhard, professor of engineering and history, observed that “[t]oday’s engineers 
have reached the point where they invest far more time in the problems of combining elements 
effectively than they spend inventing them in the first place.” JOHN LIENHARD, THE ENGINES OF 
OUR INGENUITY 170 (2000). 
 312. Mayo recognized that the “building block” concern is not easily administrable. See 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (“And so the cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against 
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In contrast, courts have been more hesitant to articulate normative 
criteria for first-order machines. For example, in Diehr, the normative 
criterion of industrial efficiency remains implicit.313 Diehr does not 
explicitly reason how a technical effect (e.g., “transforming an article 
to a different state or thing”314) satisfies a normative criterion (e.g., 
industrial efficiency). Perhaps courts are not well-suited to regulate 
first-order machines and to make technocratic policy decisions about 
their environmental, economic, and social impacts.315 Perhaps the 
constitutional term “progress” should be simply construed as simply 
relating to the dissemination or spread of knowledge. Even so, given 
the pervasiveness of second-order machines, courts cannot avoid 
making technocratic determinations about second-order machines as 
“building blocks” for future technologies.316 It is an open questions 
whether the fact that courts are already engaging in such technocratic 
inquiries would encourage courts to be more explicitly normative (e.g., 
clearer articulation of values) and/or regulatory in the context of first-
order machines. 
Second, the schematization reveals more clearly when the 
eligibility inquiry may likely be speculative.317 Speculation about 
second-order machines as “building blocks” for future technologies is 
likely unavoidable because, especially in an economy in which second-
order machines are pervasive, a particular course of technological 
development is far from inevitable.318 As Allen observed, “[a]n 
economy of second-order machines causes technical alternatives to 
proliferate, continuously enlarging the problems of synergy and the 
patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more 
easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.”). 
 313. See supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text. 
 314. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981). 
 315. I am using the term “technocratic [policy decision]” in the sense that policy should be 
decided by experts (e.g., scientists, engineers, and policy makers) who have a better grasp of the 
technological possibilities and their impacts. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 (“Difficult questions 
of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the 
form and duration of such protection can be answered by Congress on the basis of current 
empirical data not equally available to this tribunal.”) (footnote omitted); Benson, 409 U.S. at 73 
(“If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees 
of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings which 
canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field entertain.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 316. See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text. 
 318. See, e.g., Feenberg, supra note 23, at 14 (observing that “the public is constituted by 
the technologies that bind it together but in turn it transforms the technologies that constitute it. 
Neither society nor technology can be understood in isolation from each other because neither has 
a stable identity or form.”). 
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scope of technical choice.”319 If speculation is unavoidable, courts 
should proceed carefully. For example, the unexamined premise of 
Benson’s futuristic vision that includes “operation of a train to 
verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law books for 
precedents . . . performed through any existing machinery or future-
devised machinery” is that such machinery will not utilize alternative 
encodings or number systems (e.g., ternary logic of three possible 
values), both of which have been realized.320 In retrospect, Benson’s 
premise may be justifiable given the patent term and the pace of 
technological development. However, Benson’s rhetoric of 
technological inevitability obscures an unavoidable speculative turn in 
the eligibility inquiry.  
Flook also obscures the speculative turn in the eligibility inquiry. 
In contrast to Benson, which lists possible future technologies, Flook 
addresses the “building block” concern by analogizing the technology 
at issue to an application of the 2πr formula to calculate the 
circumference of a wheel.321 However, the rhetoric of analogy differs 
from that of the list. The analogy strives for identity rather than 
plurality. The analogy, unlike the list, does not positively recite 
speculations about other possible applications of the formula at issue. 
The analogy leaves for the reader the unenviable task of completing the 
argument with speculations about other applications and future 
technologies. However, for the attentive reader, the analogy is flawed. 
A circumference cannot be calculated without the 2πr formula which 
is a fundamental equation in Euclidean geometry. By contrast, there are 
many formulas or filters to “smooth” a signal based on its history.322 
Such filters were already widely employed to process signals for a wide 
range of applications.323 Rather than avoiding the difficulties inherent 
in the eligibility inquiry, the Court in Flook should have (more 
 319. ALLEN, supra note 122, at 111. 
 320. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract 
and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion. 
The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to 
researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery or 
future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”). 
 321. “[R]espondent’s claim is, in effect, comparable to a claim that the formula 2[π]r can be 
usefully applied in determining the circumference of a wheel.” Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 
(1978). 
 322. As discussed above, the algorithm at issue in Flook is a form of exponential smoothing 
which assigns to past observations exponentially decreasing weights over time. See supra note 
72. 
 323. See generally ROBERT GOODELL BROWN, SMOOTHING, FORECASTING AND 
PREDICTION OF DISCRETE TIME SERIES (1963).  
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explicitly) considered these existing technologies as “building blocks” 
in its speculative inquiry about future risks of pre-emption. 
Lastly, the schematization provides for the normative inquiry a 
starting point and a direction for refinement. By initially characterizing 
a technology as primarily first-order or second-order, courts can rely 
on normative criteria developed in case law. Next, by considering how 
a technology exceeds or transcends the schema, courts can refine the 
normative inquiry. For example, the Court in Alice could initially 
characterize the technology at issue as a second-order machine. At the 
appropriate level of abstraction, the technology at issue in Alice can be 
characterized a “building block” because, for example, the proxy 
pattern (i.e., as exemplified by the “shadow record”) may be useful in 
other fields or applications. The Court may inquire whether the proxy 
pattern “building block” is applicable to and, as claimed, risks pre-
empting other applications.  
 Next, the Court can refine its normative inquiry by considering 
“first-order” effects of the invention as a second-order machine. For 
example, the Court may inquire into other kinds of efficiency that are 
more abstract (for which the relationship to physical quantities is more 
attenuated). Just as this article’s critique of Altai suggests a cognitive 
efficiency, so the dissent in the Federal Circuit, with its analogy to 
Diehr, suggests a transactional efficiency in machine-mediated or 
machine-machine systems.324 Thus, freed from the outmoded 
conception of technology as discrete machines, courts can more clearly 
see the object of its analysis. For software-implemented inventions, 
courts can be more receptive to a vision of technology that recognizes 
the changed nature of the machine. 
CONCLUSION 
The jurisprudence on subject-matter eligibility in patent law has 
borne out of Gertrude Stein’s observation that there is lag between our 
world and our conceptions.325 Just as Karl Marx and his contemporaries 
 324. “The claims here are analogous to those found patent eligible in Diehr. Indeed, the 
computer system [in Diehr] supplied the speed, accuracy, reliability, and automaticity that 
enhanced and applied the known rubber molding process and formulae. . . . Here, the claim recites 
a machine and other steps to enable transactions. The claim begins with the machine acquiring 
data and ends with the machine exchanging financial instructions with other machines. The 
‘abstract idea’ present here is not disembodied at all, but is instead integrated into a system 
utilizing machines. In sum, the system claims are indistinguishable from those in Diehr.” CLS 
Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 
734 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (emphases added). 
 325. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
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struggled to understand a new technologized world, so courts are faced 
today with a similar difficulty. Courts have presumed that 
contemporary legal thought is equipped, conceptually and 
linguistically, to understand the full significance of modern 
technologies. I submit that § 101 jurisprudence may bear out Stein's 
observation that we remain “at least several generations behind 
[our]selves.”326  
This article examined how juristic formulations reveal the limits 
and limitations of our concepts and our language.327 The limitations of 
legal thought in understanding a complex technological reality should 
not be an unpalatable idea for the history of scientific thought also 
reveals the limited reach of our concepts in our attempts to understand 
a complex physical reality. For example, the classical concepts of 
“particle” and “wave” fail to fully explain the phenomena of light. 
Einstein observed that “[w]e are faced with a new kind of difficulty. 
We have two contradictory pictures of reality; separately neither of 
them [particle or wave theory] fully explains the phenomena of light, 
but together they do.”328 Similarly, with software, we are faced with an 
entirely new technological artifact that seems to be at once a writing 
and a machine.329 Software reveals its dual nature in copyright law as 
software-as-writing and in patent law as software-as-machine.  
This article argues that patent law can learn from copyright law. 
Copyright law teaches that the reception of software-as-writing in the 
eligibility inquiry should involve a reading that is faithful to the actual 
process of its creation. This article’s critique of Altai shows that the 
creative process of writing software can be described in terms of design 
 326. Stein, supra note 20, at 521.  
 327. See, e.g., supra notes 24–27, 64–65, 119, 126–129, 254–257, 275–278, 286–292 and 
accompanying text. I submit that Knuth’s observation about programming languages applies also 
to jurisprudential language: “[t]he language in which we express our ideas has a strong influence 
on our thought processes.” Knuth, Structured Programing, supra note 169, at 275.  
 328. ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 263 (1967).  
 329. The scholarship on the nature of software remains rudimentary. In The Ontology of 
Cyberspace, David Koepsell, professor of philosophy and law, observed that “[a]s in languages, 
whose flexibility accommodate a possibly infinite number of forms of expression for any general 
idea, computers may be programmed a possibly infinite number of ways. This flexibility has 
demonstrated that atoms and bits, like language, are just other media of expression.” See DAVID 
R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE: LAW, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 103 (2000). While Koepsell correctly suggests that emerging 
technologies such as software have revealed conceptual difficulties in intellectual property law, 
Koepsell fails to closely examine the dual and unique nature of software. One critic laments that 
Koepsell treats software as ontologically unexceptional, and is unwilling to take seriously the 
difficult questions surrounding the unique novelty of software. Rita F. Lin, Note, 14 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 315, 329 (2000–01) (reviewing DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE 
(2000)).  
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choices (unfolding a grammar of creation, as it were). Like choice of 
words and turns of phrases, design choices in the creative process of 
writing software have consequences that reverberate through the whole 
edifice, through its hidden couplings and abstractions to its external 
aspects. Just as a literary scholar or critic cannot fully attend to the 
deeper movements of a text without a comfortable fluency in the 
language, so jurists cannot explicate the full significance of the object 
of its analysis without being technologically literate.330 The analysis of 
the software at issue in Altai revealed that its external aspects (e.g., 
parameter lists and macros) intimate a hidden architecture that is 
structured by design choices, the reasons for which are determinative 
of how those external aspects are characterized. Similarly, the analysis 
of the software at issue in Alice revealed that, at a lower level of 
abstraction, its external aspects (e.g., the shadow record) are integrated 
into a hidden architecture, the whole of which is more than the sum of 
its parts. In the final analysis, without a careful inquiry into the creative 
process, courts cannot properly determine the appropriate level of 
abstraction for claim construction—a critical determination in the 
patentable subject-matter eligibility inquiry.331   
 
 330. Here, technological literacy means not only a fluency in the technical language of 
computer science but also an informed understanding of the nature of computer technology.  Yet, 
the metaphor of literacy may still lead us away from a needful kind of software criticism that this 
article has elaborated, from an access to and a critical reception of the human act of creation. 
“Even the transposed, groping metaphor of computer literacy indicates a latent concern for 
something more in the notion of literacy than the sheerly instrumental value of an alphabet that 
can aid communication . . . on a deeper ontological level, the reading and writing of books has 
significance beyond the merely instrumental. The book defines a certain way in which access to 
things in the world is fostered, a certain modeling of the way things are held up to attention. 
Literacy is as much an expression of the way a person inhabits the world as it is an instrument 
within the world of human concerns.” See MICHAEL HEIM, ELECTRIC LANGUAGE: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF WORD PROCESSING 167 (1987). 
 331. But see Chiang, supra note 78, at 1152 (arguing compellingly that the level-of-
abstraction problem has been obscured in patent law but ultimately presenting a false choice that 
“[s]election [of the appropriate level of abstraction] can be done either by the transparent 
[economic] balancing of competing interests or by the invocation of absolutist yet contradictory 
rules that yield no coherent principle.”). 
 
